Copyright © 1956 Lithuanian Student Association, Inc.
No. 2(7) - June 1956
Editor of this issue: L. Sabaliūnas



* The -Report of the Select Committee on Communist aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress.

Following the Moscow ultimatum to Lithuania of midnight June 14—15, 1940, the abyss of anarchy yawned before Lithuania. The attitude of the Moscow functionaries in regard to the Lithuanian nation clearly indicated that they strove to demolish the internal order, destroy the unifying foundation, and to bring the nation to chaos.

To resist was almost unthinkable, since actually, besides the Council of Ministers, four other governments appeared on the scene:

(a)    The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania.
It terrorized the government official, forcing them to obey the regulations not of the legal government but the demands of the Central Committee; it set in motion through the press, radio, and mass meetings a blindly destructive propaganda machine; it gave aid to the strikers and organized the scum of the populace which they used in all types of demonstrations to intimidate the peaceful inhabitants.

(b)    The administration of the Bolshevik Army of Occupation.
It not only set up its own regulations, for the most part unenforceable, but it also threatened to take steps against those who would sabotage the "rightful" demands of the Army. It took charge of the Communist demonstrations, threatening to provide them with an armed escort should the Lithuanian Government dare to forbid the populace the right to express their sympathy for Moscow which freed this "populace" from the "bloody" Fascist regime of Smetona. It immediately demanded the liquidation of S a u 1 i a i (The Lithuanian Home Guard), and added that should the Lithuanian Government contrive to delay the matter, the administration itself would attend to it by force; furthermore, the Government would be held accountable for any incidents which would hinder the peaceful liquidation of S a u 1 i a i.

(c)    The Moscow Legation in Lithuania.
It was not as brutal as the Military Government, but its manner was most exasperating. It was always demanding the removal of this or that official, indicating which resolutions the Council of Ministers should adopt, designating the proper relations with foreign representatives who should be recalled and representatives, and specifying those of our just who should replace them. In the beginning all such demands were presented through Paleckis (the puppet president), who presented them to me supposedly in his own name, but when the Russian Legation discovered that the demands which they presented through Paleckis were being ignored, they began to apply directly to me supposedly with suggestions only. Threats were not employed. And when, on several occasions, I had had rather sharp conversations with Dekanozov the Soviet Minister, Pozd-niakov, always arrived to apologize. It was explained that Dekanozov is a Caucasian, a hot-blooded person who does not always know how to control himself. But at the same time it was also advised that in order to maintain good relations with the Moscow Government it was absolutely necessary to take Dekanozov's opinion into account since that opinion was not his own, but that of the Moscow Government which would like to trust fully the Lithuanian Government, and it should not be thought that the attitude of the present administration is insincere or that it has secret aspirations, perhaps even unfriendly ones, 

(d) "Our" Ministry of the Interior.
While in power, the Nationalist regime (in order to combat the destructive elements and to a certain extent) in its struggle with the opposition, had issued a whole series of decrees granting extensive powers to the Minister of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior became (sort of) an independent state within the State. The Minister (it seemed) could completely disregard the Council of Ministers. He was more under the personal discretion and surveilance of the President than under the Council. He had the power not only to arrest all those who appeared dangerous to him, but also to exile T them from Lithuania with the President's T approval. He conducted, or he at least had the power to conduct, an independent policy; he managed the affairs of the country as he saw fit, and according to his discretion he could disband every organization, party, even commercial and industrial institutions. The radio stations were in his hands which he controlled by agreement with the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Gedvila, who it appeared was a Communist of long standing, now began to use his powers extensively, always with the approval of the (puppet) president, J. Paleckis. He reorganized the Ministry of the Interior from its very foundations; all officials, from ordinary policemen to county supervisors, and directors of the Ministry departments were discharged, and Communists or Communist sympathizers put in their places. In the Ministry itself, although the higher posts were occupied by Lithuanian citizens, for the most part of Jewish origin, each was assigned either an adviser or an assistant sent from Moscow in whose hands the power lay. These men enforced the Moscow decrees and acted only upon instructions received from their government....

We are the first victims of the Bolsheviks in Europe; we knew neither their tactics, methods, nor final aims. Therefore, it is not surprising that we thought that most of what took place occured without the knowledge and approval of Moscow. If eminent diplomats of Western Europe and America allowed themselves to be deceived they failed to orientate themselves, then, God, Himself, therefore allowed us to be deceived as well.