Copyright © 1963 Lithuanian Students Association, Inc.
Vol. 9, No.2 - 1963
Editor of this issue: Thomas Remeikis
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN LITHUANIA
Moscow devotes a great deal of attention to the development of industry in Lithuania and in the other Baltic republics. Obviously, it has specific motives for this. In the opinion of Communist leaders, the industrial proletariat is the main support of a Communist regime, whereas Lithuania, until the Soviet occupation, was an essentially agricultural country. In the eyes of Moscow, therefore, Lithuania's industrialization is equivalent to its "Communization". But this is not the only value Moscow sees in the industrialization of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The industrialization of a country would be considered a desirable and laudable endeavor if it were carried out in the interest of the country concerned. But the motives which guide Moscow in industrializing these countries are far from being in the best interests of the countries involved.
In the years following World War II, industry was being developed faster in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia than in the Soviet Union as a whole. Taking 1940 as the baseline, by 1959 Lithuania had increased its industrial production 9.1 times, while the Soviet Union as a whole had increased its industrial production only 4.8 times in the same period, according to Soviet sources.1 Apparently, industry in the other Soviet republics had not been given the same attention. For instance, the industrial production of Byelorussia in 1959 was 3.8 times greater than in 1940, of Ukraine - 3.4 times, of RSFSR - 4.5 times, of Uzbek - 3.8 times, etc. The only other republic whose rate of industrial development approached that of the Baltic countries was Moldavia, which was occupied by the Soviet Union at about the same time as Lithuania. The industrial production of Moldavia increased 8.3 times in the period between 1940 and 1959.2
One may doubt the accuracy of Soviet statistics, especially in the area of industrial production. There are some who believe that in comparing Lithuania's industrial output in later years with that of 1940, the Soviets intentionally mislead by taking as the baseline only a portion of Lithuania's industrial output in the year 1940, i. e., that portion which was produced after Lithuania was annexed to the Soviet Union in July of that year; this would mean that the industrial production of only the last 5 or 6 months of 1940 comprises the baseline figures. Whatever the case may be, there is enough other evidence to show that the rate of industrialization in Lithuania during the postwar years was higher than in the USSR as a whole. For example, other Soviet sources indicate that the growth of industrial production in Lithuania in the years 1946 -1950 was 37% while in the Soviet Union as a whole there was a growth of 21.8% during the same years. Again, between 1951 and 1955, Lithuania's industrial output increased 21% per year, while the increase in the Soviet Union as a whole was 13.1% per year in the same period.3
The following table shows the relative contribution of specific industries to total industrial output during the years 1939-1958:4
to Total Industrial Production
|Automotive, Tool, and Metal Processing||4.8||9.2||12.1||12.4|
It is well known that the Soviets have stressed and still stress the development of heavy industry or, to be more exact, the production of equipment for industrial production. The preceding table demonstrates that the same policy was followed in Lithuania: the fastest-growing industry in comparison to total industrial production was the automotive, tool, and metal processing industry. However, the development of these industries is of questionable value to Lithuania itself and may even be harmful in certain respects, for only a small proportion of all the machines and implements produced in Lithuania is actually used in the country; most of it is shipped to the Soviet Union. The goods produced in the turbine factory "Pergalė" in Kaunas, the lathe factory "Žalgiris" in Naujoji Vilnia, the condenser plant in Panevėžys, or in other similar factories may be found everywhere in the Soviet Union, while only a small portion of them remain in Lithuania itself. The exploitative character of the Soviet industrialization policy becomes even more obvious if one considers the industries that were intentionally neglected and given no encouragement.
Most noteworthy is the lagging of electrical power production behind the growth of industry in general. According to Soviet statistics, in 1956, general industrial production in Lithuania increased 17 %, while electrical power production increased 14.4%; in 1957, industrial production increased 23%, electrical power production - 14%. The following table is presented to further illustrate this lag:
A comparison of the growth of general production with electrical power production (year 1940=100)5
— General Industrial Production
b) — Electrical Power Production
The slow development of electrical power production in comparison to general industrial production shows that, first, the country's general economic interests were not given much consideration, for they demand that the rate of development of the power industry be strictly correlated with the development of the national economy as a whole. Secondly, statistics regarding the comparative utilization of electrical power by different branches of the economy presented in the next table show that precisely those industries which should be fostered most in Lithuania f e. g. consumer's goods industry, or the food industry) were those most adversely affected by the shortage.
Utilization of electrical power in 1950-1955 by different branches of the economy6
|Branch of the Economy||
| 1. Industry
d) Building materials
e) Wood and paper
f) Consumers' goods
i ) Local and cooperatives
It is evident from the preceding table that the increase in use of electrical power by the consumers' goods, food, wood, and printing industries, by railroads, in agriculture, and in the collective farms was several times less than the average increase in the use of electrical power during the years 1950-1955 in the country.
Examining more closely those industries which until now have been neglected, one will see that they are, first, those that help the development of agriculture and, secondly, those for which the raw materials are available in Lithuania itself.
For all practical purposes, the production of mineral fertilizers has been completely neglected until now, although there has always been a great shortage of such fertilizers. According to the calculations of Lithuanian economists, if the land is to produce good crops, it is necessary to use from 2 to 2½ million tons of mineral fertilizers per year.7 However, only about .25 million tons of such fertilizers were actually used in 1954, and about .48 million tons in 1958. These mineral fertilizers were brought in from other areas of the Soviet Union, although all the necessary resources for this production are available in Lithuania. It is significant that the one fertilizer plant that had been operating during Lithuania's years of independence has also been shut down.
Although agriculture still has a relatively high standing in Lithuania's economic structure, the production of agricultural machinery, implements, and tools has not been fostered. A few factories such as "ūkmašina" and "Komunaras" (the latter produced agricultural machinery until 1959 when it was switched to production of other goods) could not at all meet the demand for such items. Most agricultural machinery and implements were and still are brought in from the Soviet Union, but not in sufficient quantities. The President of Lithuanian SSR Academy of Science, prof. J. Matulis, who is a delegate to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, speaking in a session of that Soviet in Moscow in December of 1960, earnestly pleaded for more agricultural machinery to be designated for Lithuanian collective and state farms.8 The economists of Soviet Lithuania admit that the building materials industry is also insufficiently developed, although again, natural resources are available for its development.
It is evident, therefore, that Lithuanian industries which require raw materials from Russia, Ukraine, or other parts of the Soviet Union have been given primary consideration, although their products are of little use to Lithuania itself, while those industries which would fit the natural structure of Lithuania's economy, for which raw materials are locally available, and which certainly would contribute to the country's general welfare have been neglected or underdeveloped.
In this connection it is significant to see the relationship of import and export of manufactured goods, semi-manufactured products, and raw materials during the year 1960.9
|(% total weight)|
The relatively high position of food products in the list of exported goods from Lithuania is noteworthy. It has been mentioned that the food industry is one of the "step-daughters" of the Soviet economists, for comparatively little capital is invested in the food industry and it is poorly supplied with needed equipment and power; its products, however, take first place in the list of goods exported from Lithuania. Such exploitative policies are also obvious in the building materials industry. Although there is a great shortage of building materials in Lithuania, practically the entire output of the concrete plant in Akmenė is exported and used for construction outside Lithuania's territorial boundaries, because the concrete produced at Akmenė seems to be of higher quality than the average Soviet concrete.
In recent years, several new trends have appeared in Soviet economic policies regarding Lithuania. In the process of accelerating Lithuania's industrialization, giant industrial plants are being built, which are designed to supply all the Baltic republics and even the entire western section of the Soviet Union with their products. These new plants include:
1. A power plant near Vievis whose first turbine was put into operation in December of 1962. This is planned to be the largest power plant of its kind in the Soviet Union; when completed, it will have the capacity of 2,000,000 kilowatts. It will then supply electricity to Latvia, the Kaliningrad territory, and to Belorussia.10
2. A chemical plant in Kėdainiai. It is built on a 47 hectare tract of land, is to be completed in 1964. Since water available from the river Nevėžis was considered insufficient for the needs of the plant, a canal was built connecting the river Dubysa with Nevėžis. The plant is designed to produce sulfuric acid, mineral fertilizers, cement, etc. It will supply a large part of the western Soviet Union with its products. The raw materials: concentrated apatite will come from the Kolo peninsula and sulfur will be imported from Ukraine.11
3. A liquid fertilizer plant in Jonava to produce largely nitrogen and ammonia liquid fertilizers. It is to be the first plant of its kind in the Soviet Union and will use natural gas brought in by pipeline from Dashava, Ukraine. This plant is included in a list of the most important current major construction works of the Soviet Union and is set to be completed in 1964. It will supply the Baltic republics, Belorussia, Ukraine, and a part of Soviet Russia with liquid fertilizers.12
Other large construction works include a synthetic materials factory in Kaunas, a food vending machine factory in Marijampolė which will employ 5,000 workers and engineers, a metal foundry near Kaunas, a refrigerator plant "Vienybė" in Ukmergė, a furniture factory in Vilnius (to be the largest in Lithuania), a glass factory in Panevėžys, a meat packing plant in Klaipėda, and so on.13 There are plans to build 700 new factories and plants in Lithuania during the next 20 years.14
It is possible, that once all these factories are built, the demand for various goods in Lithuania itself will be somewhat better met. One might even see in this certain post-Stalinist concessions to the occupied countries, but further scrutiny reveals other inherent developments; the Soviet Union is imposing on Lithuania economic plans which cannot be put into effect with the available labor supply and, therefore, will necessitate importing of laborers from other areas of the Soviet Union. This becomes clear upon analysis of the supply and demand for labor in Lithuania.
Natural population growth in Lithuania during the period 1950 -1958 was 1.07% per year.15 One may assume that the natural population growth until 1980 will be approximately 1.1% per year. Since according to the January 15, 1959, census Lithuania had 2,711,000 inhabitants, it would seem that by 1979, on the basis of natural population growth (without immigration), Lithuania could have a population of 3,370,000. Thus, the population growth would be roughly 33,000 per year.16
What is the resulting increase in the labor force from such natural population growth? In order to determine this, it will be assumed that everybody between 16 and 60 years of age comprises the labor force potential. In 1959, out of 2,711,000 inhabitants, 1,615,000 (59.5%) fell within this age range.17 If one assumes that this percentage will not change during the coming years, and it cannot change much, this age group (from 16 to 60 years) will increase by 19,600 per year on the average (33,000 x 0.595 = 19.600). This will be called the potential labor force reserve stemming from natural population growth.
At the end of 1958 1,084,000 workers were employed in Lithuania. Of this total, 490,000 were working on collective farms, while 594,000 were employed in industry, administrative jobs, state farms, building trades, transportation, in the educational system, etc.18 It would seem natural to assume that a great majority of the employed were within the 16 to 60 age category. Percentage wise, the employed comprise about 67% of all persons within this age group. The remaining 33% are made up of the unemployed and of those unable to work (housewives, full-time students, the sick, etc.).
Clearly, not all of the 19,600 persons who were called the natural yearly increase in labor force will become employed. One may assume that the percentage of those actually entering the labor force will be approximately the same as the percentage of this age group currently employed. In other words, one may expect only about 67% of the potential yearly increase in the labor force to enter the ranks of the employed. Thus, the true yearly increase in the labor force may be approximately 13,100 persons (19,600 x 0.67=13,100). Not all able and willing to work who reach the proper age each year remain in Lithuania. It is well known that Lithuanian workers are constantly recruited for various jobs in other parts of the Soviet Union, especially in the virgin lands and the Far North. Some Lithuanians do not return to their homeland after completing their military service. Thus by a conservative estimate, Lithuania may lose 2,100 potential workers yearly. Consequently, from natural population growth, Lithuania's labor force will increase only about 11,000 persons per year. If the natural population growth were the only contributor to the labor force reserve, in 1980 the labor force would consist of 1,304,000 persons, including those working on the collective farms (1,084,000 + 20 x 11,000 = 1,304,000).
Next, one should consider what may be the actual demand for workers in the period until 1980. Somewhat of an index is provided by the current yearly increase in the number of employed in Lithuania in conjunction with the economic plans imposed by Moscow. Soviet statistics reveal the following:19
It is evident from the preceding table that the yearly increase in the number of employed exclusive of the collective farm workers was, on the average, 30,200 persons for the years 1945 -1950; 30,500 persons for the years 1951-1955; 36,800 persons for the years 1956-1960. These figures include those working on state farms and other agricultural establishments (exclusive of collective farms). If the latter are subtracted, the average yearly increase in the number of employed becomes 26,600 persons for the years 1945-1950; 23,800 persons for the years 1951-1955; 31,000 persons for the years 1956-1960.
The number working on collective farms has actually decreased about 20,000 or 30,000 persons in the period 1951-1958.20 This is mainly explained by the fact that a number of collective farms have been recently converted into state farms. Taking the two together, the number of persons working on both has increased about 60,000 in the years 1951-1958.
Now we may analyze how the demand for labor may develop during the next twenty years. Agriculture will be considered first: the Soviet planners affirm that the number of agricultural workers will be reduced considerably, while agricultural production will increase threefold in the period until 1980.21 This increase in production will supposedly be achieved not by increasing the number of workers, but as a result of increased work productivity and better crop yields. It is conceivable that as a result of mechanization and planning, the expected rise in production will actually be achieved without any increase in the number employed, but it can hardly be imagined that the increased productivity will be achieved concurrently with a substantial reduction in the number of agricultural workers. Even now there is an acute shortage of agricultural workers. As harvest time approaches, workers and employees from the cities are brought to the collective and state farms to help with the harvest, for those regularly working on such farms cannot cope with the work. Thus, one may assume, that, at best, the number employed in agriculture will remain about constant during the coming years, and that the entire increase in the labor force will enlarge the ranks of those employed in industry and other branches of the economy.
What will be the demand for labor in other branches of the economy? The following table attempts to show the expected increase of workers and employees between 1960 and 1979 in different areas of the national economy, based on actual increases in these areas during the years 1950-1959.
Average increase of workers and employees in different branches
of the economy per year
|Shipping and waterways|
|Transportation and roadbuilding||2,260||2,000|
|Trade and services||1,120||1,000|
|Education (all levels)||2,510||2,000|
|Scientific and research institutions, geological surveys and hydrometeorological services||780||800|
|Insurance and finance|
|Administration of state, economic, and social organizations||990|
|Others (major reconstruction, agricultural services and veterinary medicine, housing and communal services, newspaper offices, publishing houses, etc.)||2,450||2,400|
It must be noted that the expected increase in the number of industrial workers which makes up about 50% of the expected increase in the entire labor force during this period is based on Soviet calculations. The expected increase in the number employed by other areas of the economy was calculated by the author, taking into account the role of that area in the country's total economic picture and the expected course of its development. For instance, the Soviets are planning to expand the building industry to a considerable degree in the years 1960-1979, and to build more homes and industrial structures than in the 1950-1959 period. For this reason, the expected increase of workers in this field during 1960-1979 is given as somewhat higher than the increase in the past.
Considering all these facts, it is evident that the demand for labor will increase on the average by about 32,500 persons per year, while the natural growth of the labor force will provide only 11,000 persons per year. It seems that the shortage of 21,500 workers and employees will have to be met by persons from outside of Lithuania. Since the labor situation in the two other Baltic republics, Latvia and Estonia, is very similar or even worse, there is no reason to expect that the labor force will be supplemented from those two countries; consequently, there remains only the migration of laborers to Lithuania from other parts of the Soviet Union, primarily from Soviet Russia. Thus, one faces the likely possibility that until 1980, Moscow will resettle in Lithuania about 430,000 workers and employees (21,500 x 20 = 430,000), the majority of whom will be Russians.
Such massive infiltration of foreign nationals into Lithuania will clearly have a marked affect on the country's nationality structure and social climate. Obviously, not only single persons, but workers with families will be moved to Lithuania; even by conservative estimate one can assume that for every two workers or employees arriving in Lithuania there will be one dependent family member coming along, so that by 1980, about 645,000 Russians and other non-Lithuanians will have come to Lithuania. If this were actually to occur, the percentage of Lithuanians in the country would drop from 79.3% in 1959 to about 66.3% in 1980, while the number of foreign-born, the majority of whom would be Russians, would increase to 33.7%. Considering this from the national standpoint, the effect of such an occurrence would be far greater that the mere figures indicate. Such a flood of Russians into Lithuania would only ease the russification of the country, which is intently pursued even now. Then the time would not be far off when Lithuanians would be only a minority in their own land.23a
The preceding calculations were made on the assumption that the rate of industrialization in Lithuania will remain about the same as it was until 1960. This assumption is quite realistic; eventually, an even faster rate of industrialization may be expected. It is evident from the aforementioned facts that Russia is urgently forcing the industrialization of Lithuania and the other Baltic republics; about 700 new factories and industrial plants are expected to be built in Lithuania alone.24 It is being affirmed that by 1965, Lithuania will be producing about 40% of the Soviiet Union's total production of high precision lathes;25 a drill factory in Vilnius will supposedly be the largest factory of its type in Europe. In general, the metal processing, automotive, and electronics industries are to be greatly expanded. They are industries that need relatively small amounts of raw materials, but comparatively many skilled workers. In the face of these facts, one can again ask what are the motives that lead Moscow to impose such industrialization policies on Lithuania, i. e., what are Moscow's economic and political designs?
With the exception of raw materials for the building, consumers goods, and the food industry, Lithuania has no other natural resources. Thus, from that standpoint, it is not a fit country in which to develop metal, automotive, and similar industries. It has also been shown that there will be no surplus of workers in Lithuania, so that this factor can be discounted. One may think that Lithuania's geographical location is so advantageous that from the standpoint of transportation alone it would be worthwhile to develop such industries there. Lithuania's geographical location is advantageous; this can be seen from one look at the map of Europe. However, advantages possessed by the Lithuanian cities of Vilnius and Kaunas are also possessed by sections of Soviet Russia and Belorussia which border the Baltic republics. The latter regions have one added advantage in that they possess large labor force reserves; this can be seen by observing the distribution of population between rural and urban areas. (See the following table.)
Urban and Rural Populations (% of total population)26
Pskov region (RSFSR)
Thus, it appears that it is not economic considerations that lead Moscow to industrialize Lithuania at a rate which exceeds the labor force reserves available in Lithuania. One cannot help concluding that Moscow's motives are purely political. Industrialization of Lithuania at this rate actually has as its goal the colonization, russification, and complete assimilation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. All this is done under the cloak of promoting economic progress, thus avoiding the picture of direct colonization, since theoretically, Lithuania's Communist Party and the government of Soviet Lithuania are to be held responsible for the industrialization and consequent colonization policies. It is quite possible that questions of internal security also enter into the masked colonization policies. Most likely Moscow still remembers the spontaneous and total revolt of the Lithuanian nation against their imposed government during the first days of the Russo-German conflict in 1941, which added to the rapid disintegration of the Soviet front in this region and contributed to their hurried retreat from the Baltic states. The massive deportations from Lithuania during the Stalinist years were undoubtedly in part a security measure to prevent a repetition of such an occurrence in the event of another war. But today such violent measures are considered inexpedient.
Naturally, more perspicacious persons in the Baltic states see the course that Moscow's policies take and understand their true goals. This was particularly clearly demonstrated by certain recent events in Latvia. A so-called "national opposition" group arose within Latvia's Communist Party; the main demands of this opposition group were as follows:27
1. The development of industries in Latvia whose products are shipped out to Soviet Russia and other Soviet Union republics must be slowed down. Those industries which would make Latvia independent of imports from other Soviet republics should be primarily fostered.
2. Priority should be given to consumers' goods industry over heavy industry, since Latvia does not have a sufficient labor force to meet the demands of heavy industry.
3. In accepting members to Latvia's Communist Party, priority should be given to persons of Latvian nationality.
4. Russian officials in Latvia should learn the Latvian language within a reasonable length of time.
These demands arose from the desire of Latvian Communists to stop the rapid russification of Latvia. In 1959 Moscow was able to squash this opposition group; it was accused of having "autarkic" and "sectionalistic" aims. The members of this group were removed from their positions in government and the party and persons more loyal to Moscow were given their posts (some were brought in from other parts of the Soviet Union). However, one can hardly say that the problem was thus solved forever. A nation fighting for its very existence will undoubtedly show its opposition in many different ways. Similar opposition groups will probably also spring up in Lithuania when, as a result of Moscow's assimilative policies, the nation's existence will be in grave danger. Then Moscow's industrialization policies may bear quite different fruits than it expects.
A new affirmation of Moscow's true policies came in terms of news received while this article was being written. Apparently, by decree of the Communist Party Central Committee the industry of the Economic Council of the Königsberg region (now called Kaliningrad) has been assigned to the Lithuanian SSR Economic Council. It is not clear when the decision was actually made, because it was not publicized, but in a meeting of the Lithuanian SSR Economic Council's economic — trade-union activists on February 19, 1963, (in Vilnius) it was spoken of as an established fact.28 A big delegation from the Kaliningrad region was also present at this meeting. It must be remembered that the Kaliningrad region is now a part of Soviet Russia and, therefore, administratively belongs directly to Moscow. It has been estimated that January 1, 1962, that region had a population of 644,000, practically all Russian;29 68% of these people lived in urban areas and 32% lived in rural areas. In Lithuania, 41 % of the population live in urban areas. A comparison of the percentage of urban residents in the Königsberg region and in Lithuania suggests that all the workers of the Königsberg region would constitute about 45-50% of persons employed in Lithuania. In the Königsberg region, the fishing industry ranks highest (43% of total industrial output), then comes the automotive industry (21%), the cellulose-paper industry, the food industry, the consumers' goods industry, etc.
The assignment of the Königsberg region industries to the Lithuanian Economic Council, while keeping the region as an integral part of Soviet Russia, opens the door to further opportunities for colonization of Lithuania in the name of industrialization. Some of the Economic Council's management bodies for this enlarged economic region will have to be located no longer in Vilnius or Kaunas but in Königsberg, alias Kaliningrad. Naturally the official language even of intra-office written communications will now have to be Russian. This will also facilitate the migration of Russians, especially industrial workers and other "technicians" into Lithuania. There will be many opportunities for this in connection with employment and Moscow will undoubtedly try to multiply such opportunities.
1. Tsentralnoe Statistecheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,
Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 Godu, Moskva, 1960, p. 148; hereafter
cited by original title only.
3. K. Meškauskas, Tarybų Lietuvos industrializavimas (The Industrialization of Soviet Lithuania), Vilnius, 1960, p.p. 129-130.
4. Lietuvos TSR Mokslų Akademija, Ekonomikos institutas, 20 metų Tarybų Lietuvos liaudies ūkiui (Institute of Economics, Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences. 20 Years to the National Economy of the Lithuanian SSR), Vilnius, 1960, p. 86; hereafter cited by original title only.
5. K. Meškauskas, op. cit., p, 153; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenia pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, SSSR v. Tsifrakh v 1961 Godu, Moskva, 1962, p. 150,
6. K. Meškauskas, op. cit., p, 159.
7. M. Gregorauskas, Tarybų Lietuvos žemes ūkis 1940 -1960 m. (Agriculture in Soviet Lithuania, 1940-1960), Vilnius, 1960. p. 80.
8. Tiesa. (Pravda), December 24, 1960.
9. Liaudies Ūkis, (National Economy), 1961, No. 11, pp. 338-339.
10. Tiesa, December 31. 1962.
11. Mokslas ir gyvenimas, (Science and Life), 1962, No. 6.
12. Sovetskaia Litva, April 13, 1962.
13. Sovetskaia Litva, March 10, 1962.
14. Švyturys, (The Beacon), 1961, No. 24.
15. Centrinė Statistikos Valdyba prie Lietuvos TSR Ministru Tarybos, Tarybų Lietuvos dvidešimtmetis: Statistinių duomenų rinkinys (Central Administration of Statistics of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, Twenty Years of Soviet Lithuania; a Collection of Statistical Data), Vilnius, 1960, p. 325; hereafter cited by original title only.
16. Soviet statisticians predict that by 19SO Lithuania will have 3,400,000 inhabitants as a result of natural population growth. See Švyturys, 1961, No. 22.
17. Tarybų Lietuvos dvidešimtmetis, p. 268.
18. Ibid., pp. 282-283.
19. Ibid.; 20 metų Tarybų Lietuvos liaudies ūkiui, p. 268 and p. 308; Tiesa, January 25, 1961.
20. Statistecheskoe Upravlenie Litovskoi SSR, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR, Statisticheskii Sbornik, Vilnius, 1957, (pp. 135-136 of the Lithuanian language edition); Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 Godu, Moskva, 1959, pp. 502-503.
21. švyturys, Vilnius, 1961, No. 22.
22. Tarybų Lietuvos dvidešimtmetis, op. cit., pp. 282-283.
23. According to Soviet sources, the number of persons employed in Lithuanian industry will reach 444,000 by 1975. This corresponds to the assumed average yearly increase of persons employed in this branch of the economy. 20 metų Tarybų Lietuvos liaudies ūkiui, op. cit., p. 308.
23a. According to the census of January 15, 1959. in Lithuanian territory, defined according to present Soviet assigned boundaries, there were:
see Tarybų Lietuvos dvidešimtmetis, p. 78.
24. Czerwony Sztandar, Vilnius, November 15, 1961.
25. Sovetskaia Litva, Vilnius, April 4, 1961.
26. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 Godu, pp. 27-33.
27. Sovetskaia Latvia, Oct. 2, 1959 and Sept. 14, 1959; also Cina, Dec. 20, 1959.
28. Tiesa, February 21, 1963.
29. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 Godu, p. 15.