Volume 11, No.1 - Spring 1965
Editor of this issue: Thomas Remeikis
ISSN 0024-5089
Copyright © 1965 LITUANUS Foundation, Inc.


State University of New York, College at Buffalo

JULIUS P. SLAVENAS is Assistant Professor of History at the State University of New York, College at Buffalo.

With the advent of war between Russia and Germany in 1941, significant political changes took place in the Baltic area. After the swift retreat of the Russian troops, the Germans placed Lithuania, its two Baltic neighbors, and White Russia within the network of "greater Europe," the primary concern of which was to fight Russian Bolshevism. In more precise terminology, however, the construction of a "greater Europe" would have merely meant the promulgation of a "greater Germany." Concretely this was to be carried out by the establishment of the administrative-political unit known as Ostland, which comprised the above-mentioned countries. With the creation of Ostland, which was governed by Reich Commissioner Heinrich Lohse, technically a subordinate of Alfred Rosenberg and his ministry for occupied Eastern territories, the Nazis got their opportunity to put previously devised theories into practice. But what were the Nazi plans as regards Lithuania specifically and the Baltic area generally? Where did these plans originate, who were their "prime movers," and, finally, what was the relationship between theory and practice? Although in this paper emphasis is placed on Lithuania and thus the questions asked apply particularly to that country, it is impossible to ignore the other territorial components of Ostland, for in many instances what applied to Lithuania also applied to Latvia, Estonia, and, to a lesser degree, to White Russia.

Even during the first German occupation of Lithuania, i. e. in World War I, certain ideas were being developed and promoted which were later integrated into Nazi thinking. Thus, in 1915 the German aristocrat from Latvia, Silvio von Broed-rich-Kurmalen, published his book Das Neue Ostland in which he argued that the Baltic territories should be annexed by Germany and proposed that "Reich" Germans and Russian Germans should be settled in the Baltic provinces, while the natives vre to be Germanized.1 Ludendorff, who then had political military control of the Baltic area, in essence sympathized with such projects, but did not promote them openly. In 1917, when outlining the aims of the German policies in "Ober Ost-Land," Ludendorff instructed his subordinates on the local level to give preferential treatment to Germans without, however, engaging in compulsory assimilation of the natives, lest friction increase between Germans and non-Germans.2 On the other hand, no clear-cut plans were formulated about the future of Lithuania until after the March, 1917, Revolution in Russia. It was after this period that the German authorities began showing an active interest in establishing a dynastic union of one form or another between Lithuania and Germany.3 For example, prior to the establishment of the Lithuanian Republic, there existed the famous proposal to install Duke Urach of Württemberg as King Mindaugas II, and Kaiser William II had shown some interest in securing the crown of Lithuania for one of his sons. But all of the above projects collapsed in 1918, and the allied powers virtually had to order German military contingents out of the Baltic area.

Although the dynastic projects were relegated to history, a keen interest in the Baltic area was cultivated by influential Germans; Haushofer, the dean of German geopolitics, was among them. It was Haushofer who decried the existence of a political power vacuum in Europe, be it in Switzerland, Greece, or the Baltic States. Haushofer's point was that small states would no longer remain capable of leading culturally independent existences in the future by divorcing themselves from the mainstream of world politics. Hence it was the prerogative of the major powers to fill any existing power vacuum.4 As Rauschning sees it, Haushofer's views lead directly to the Munich agreements, out of which there evolved the idea that small states had better secure "treaties of friendship and non-aggression" with the major powers.5

But it was not merely treaties of friendship that the Nazis had in mind for the Baltic area. At some time, presumably after 1933, in the presence of Hitler and other Nazis, Rausch-ning participated in a discussion of "Ostraumpolitik." Hitler, referring specifically to Lithuania, stated that' the Lithuanians could be racially assimilated! What was needed in Lithuania was a German upper class, but not one like the German barons in Latvia and Estonia, whom the Führer blamed for not assimilating the natives into the German fold. Because of their arrogance and cultural isolation from the indigenous population, the barons had failed as Germanizers.6

The significant aspect of Hitler's view is that he regarded the Baits as being essentially close to the master race, which they might join after certain corrective measures had been taken by the Germans. Hitler further developed his views at a secret speech which he delivered before future Nazi leaders in Sonthofen (Allgäu) in 1937. After attacking the ideas of World War I vintage concerning the establishment of German dynasties in the East, Hitler stated that under German rulers and by infusion of German blood, the Baltic countries, currently have-not states, would have turned prosperous. By becoming assimilated locally, the German rulers would have been in charge of states inimical to Germany. Such states would be particularly dangerous to Germany, since they would be operated by rulers of German extraction, i. e., of superior blood.7

On the other hand, it is paramount to stress Hitler's views on "bastardization." Germanization, Hitler argued, must be primarily "linked with the soil" and not with people. Negroes and Chinese are capable of learning how to speak German fluently, but they will never actually become Germans. By the same token, Hitler had no use for the Germanization policies of Josef II of Austria. Had Josef been successful in Germanizing his subjects, "the racial standards would have deteriorated." 8 It was the injection of the "Blood and Soil" theory which made Nazi thinking somewhat original in comparison to previous German expansionist theories, and this meant that only Lithuanians of good stock might be assimilated.

Hitler's views may be regarded as the essential platform for the Baltic countries in general and Lithuania in particular. Because of Polish influence in the past, as well as because of previous political-cultural conflicts between Germany and Lithuania, the most recent one being the Memel-Klaipeda controversy, the Lithuanians were ranked lowest as prospects for Germanization in comparison to the Latvians and Estonians. In this respect Hitler's views were quite similar to those of Rosenberg, and it appears that without necessarily always acknowledging it, the Fuhrer took over many theories from the minister of eastern affairs. It was Rosenberg, a Baltic German by background, who promoted clear-cut imperialism in the East. Rosenberg suggested that a correct rendition of the term "German imperialism" would be the German "Volkswille." Past rulers such as Henry the Lion, the Great Elector, and Frederick the Great, who expanded German territory, ought to be emulated.9

In the light of the preceding theoretical utterances, it should not be surprising at all that the Nazis had no intentions whatever to restore Lithuanian independence after the expulsion of the Russians in 1941. The Lithuanian Provisional Government headed by Juozas Ambrazevičius, wh\ i was formed at the time when the Soviet troops were retreating from Lithuania and before the arrival of the Germans, was not recognized by the Germans.10 To be sure, there were some minor German officials, as well as military commanders, who, mostly for reasons of expediency, promoted autonomy for the Baltic states; they realized than in 1941, after witnessing and suffering from Stalinist deportations, most Baits would be sympathetic toward a war with Russia but not toward Germanization. Peter Kleist, a foreign ministry official later assigned to Rosenberg, stands out among the more intelligent Nazi officials. Kleist is one of the few Nazis who advocated autonomy. According to him, the first military commander in Kaunas, General von Rocques, and his chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Kriegsheim were even more enthusiastic than Kleist in promoting autonomy. Unfortunately, as Kleist quite candidly observes, the two military commanders were "typical ultra- reactionaries" as viewed from the post-1933 perspective; they referred to the war, especially to the Eastern campaign, as an act of insanity.11 Kleist did not concur, with such "reactionary" views, but he found himself in a peculiar dilemma: Kleist shared the officers' view that autonomy should be granted, yet because of his loyalty to Ribbentrop and Rosenberg who were opposed to autonomy, Kleist found it difficult to promote his views publicly.12 It was even more difficult for Kleist to convince Lithuanian representatives that the Germans wanted to promote good will. It was quite obvious to Lithuanian observers that independence would not be restored.13

Nevertheless, in 1941 Kleist worked out a statute for the autonomy of the Baltic States. He suggested to Rosenberg that the "Anschluss" of the Baltic peoples with Germany would be easier to attain in this way rather than by direct and open Ger-manization. Rosenberg was reluctant to endorse this project, but was willing to allow the introduction of "national spokesmen" for the three nations.14 These spokesmen became the "general councilors" who were expected by the Germans to merely carry out instructions and serve as tools for German propaganda. Indeed, as Alexander Dallin observes: "Full-pledged partnership of the Baltic region in the New Europe was, in the Nazi mind, predicated on its thoroughgoing Ger-manization. The beneficiaries of its 'reunion with the West' were to be not its present population but the Germans who would move there in the future".15

Although Rosenberg had acquired some prominence as a theoretician,16 he was a poor administrator. Contrary to the wishes of the minister for eastern affairs, Hitler personally appointed Rosenberg's subordinates.17 At one of his table talks with Bormann in May 1942, Hitler complained that it was difficult to find men of ability for administrative jobs in the East. Hitler had a high opinion of Lohse and had given him the post in Ostland.18 Thus, to a great extent Lohse was independent from his theoretical superior, Rosenberg. But it was Rosenberg's prerogative to produce further ideological guidelines. His memorandum No. 1 issued on April 2, 1941, indicated an indebtedness to previous thinkers. Among the issues stressed in this memorandum was the colonization of the Baltic states by Volga Germans, Danes, Norwegians, and Dutch. The goal was to bring about Germanization within one or two generations. On the other hand, many intellectuals were to be deported to Central Russia.19 Interestingly enough, in the original draft of the memorandum reference was made to "Balten-land". Later the term "Baltenland" was replaced by "Ost-land".20 In June, 1941, Rosenberg suggested to his staff members that White Russia would be the most suitable area for absorbing "anti-social elements" from the Baltic territories.21 Thus by expanding Baltenland into an Ostland with White Russia, Rosenberg provided for opportunities to conveniently displace undesirable elements within the same area of jurisdiction. To promote "desirable traits", Rosenberg appointed three German historians and archeologists to study remnants of German culture in Lithuania, as well as in the two other Baltic territories.22

In matters of German culture Lithuania appeared to be a liability. Thus, Walter Zimmermann in his article "Mit Alfred Rosenberg durchs Ostland" stated that because of previous Polish influence the "general district of Lithuania" was quite different from Estonia and Latvia. Nevertheless, Zimmermann concluded by saying: "We know that the Lithuanians too are basically upright people and have a lot of good blood."23 The idea was expressed that the upright Lithuanians would collaborate with the Germanization policies and thus improve themselves racially, but this was precisely what the Lithuanians were unwilling to do. Neither did Lohse make a great impression in Lithuania and the other Baltic states with his proclamation in which he, after criticizing the policies of the former Baltic governments, promised that the Germans would provide for work, bread, and "progressive development". At the end of his statement, Lohse bluntly demanded that all regulations of the German administration be carried out unconditionally.24 For strictly German propaganda, Lohse modified his tone a bit. In an article in the Nationalsosialistische Monatshefte he spoke of the principle of "organic growth" concerning the political, economic, and cultural development in Ostland. Old institutions, he said, should not be eliminated hastily. Particularly interesting were Lohse's references to economic affairs. Decollectivization, he uttered, should also be handled slowly. The objective in Ostland was to establish a planned economy with concessions to private enterprise, emphasizing immediate war needs and the inclusion of the economy of Ostland into the "Common European" economy.25 In blunter terms, Lohse might have spoken of the Germaniza-tion of the local economy. Instead he spoke in generalities referring to the European war against Bolshevism, a war which was "imposed on us by destiny," continued Lohse. He was certain, however, that European construction and reconstruction would occur in peace.26 Such ambiguities were commonplace in most official Nazi statements. In an article in the Deutsche Zeitung in Ostland, Rosenberg stated that, until the end of the war, any plans for the Baltic territories were out of the question. Tradition and history would determine the fate of the Baltic states. An editorial in the same periodical condemned those Lithuanians who "consider that their wishes are not fulfilled quickly enough." Such malcontents were obstructing "organic evolution." 28

The Germans were particularly dissatisfied with the Lithuanian councilors who were thwarting Germanization policies and refused to endorse the recruitment of a "Volunteer legion," i.e. an S.S. Legion. As a result, in 1943 four councilors, M. Mackevičius, Germantas-Meškauskas, Puodžius, and Narakas were arrested, along with various prominent intellectuals.29 Most of these individuals were taken to the concentration camp at Stutthof.

In May of 1942, Goebbels complained in his diary about the growth of nationalistic currents in the former Baltic States. The German Wehrmacht did not shed any blood in order to set up new governments "in these midget states." He added that national socialism was too realistic and unscrupulous to do that! The demands of small nations were to be ignored, even if they were justified.30

To the chagrin of alert Nazis, the German civilian administration in Ostland was bureaucratic and inefficient. Kleist complained that in Kaunas about 170 German officials were issuing instructions to Lithuanian subordinates about the consumption of ink and erasers and could not understand why the municipal officers were functioning worse every day.31 Kleist also had a low opinion of Lohse. According to Kleist, Lohse was primarily interested in castles, hotels, and administration buildings for members of his staff.32 Moreover, when traveling in Ostland on Rosenberg's special train, Lohse became intoxicated and got into an argument with Dr. Meyer, an official in Rosenberg's ministry, about Lohse's egotistical and highhanded policies. Lohse presumably shouted at Meyer: "I assure you that nobody thinks of himself; nobody works for his own good. I don't work for myself. I work because I want to be able to set up my little son, who was just born, as a hereditary duke. That's what I am working for!" 33 Nevertheless, Kleist also accredits Lohse with some good points, one of theni being an ultimate willingness to tolerate Baltic autonomy 34 at a time when it was useful to do so.

Kleist particularly objected to the retention of collectivized property by German authorities. Previous landowners and especially farmers who had suffered from Soviet collectivizations were demoted to state employees and "administrators" of their property. Various German agencies, referred to as "Ostland Incorporated," began to direct the local economy. As Kleist sarcastically observed, soon on every vodka label there was the inscription "Monopoly of the Reich Commissioner, Ostland".35

In February of 1943, Rosenberg called a conference in Berlin to discuss Baltic problems. Lohse, Kleist, and Ministerialrat Burmeister from the ministry of the interior, who was stationed in Riga, were among the participants. It was then that Kleist, supported by Burmeister, once more promoted autonomy. Lohse went along. Rosenberg was not convinced that autonomy should be granted even though it might be expedient. Above all, he objected to the idea that the national Baltic flags be permitted to be displayed. "Their own flags? This means an Irish revolt," exclaimed Rosenberg. After this Kleist presumably left the conference room, followed by Burmeister.36 Ironically, the Baits displayed their flags on their national holidays without securing permission from the Germans. As regards autonomy, Hitler made the final decision. He vetoed the project in February of 1943.37

Again, for reasons of expediency, military commanders and Himmler himself became supporters of autonomy. In Riga, army General Von Unruh wanted to reduce the number of commissioners in Ostland and to eliminate completely the various "Ostland incorporated" agencies, which he called ''Verwaltungswasserkopfe.'' 38 But the general tried in vain. It was difficult to combat the civilian government, which, after all, predominated in Ostland.

The civilian government ant its representatives also came under the severe criticism of S. S. General Gottlob Berger, Himmler's representative with Rosenberg. Writing to the Reichsfiihrer of the S. S., Berger spoke of German tactical errors in the East. He suggested that the operation of small enterprises and limited property rights should be granted to the natives, who then would consider the Germans to be liberators from communism rather than enemies. Without mentioning any names, Berger criticized leading national socialists for being opportunists who lacked a true belief in national socialism.39 Yet, it appears that Himmler himself was a master opportunist. Himmler was interested in issuing orders for general mobilization in Latvia and Estonia. When informed that one could not draft individuals who "technically were no longer members of sovereign states" and that, if captured by the Russians' the draftees might even be shot as deserters and traitors, Himmler became quite enthusiastic about autonomy.40

The Lithuanians seemed to be least willing to comply with various mobilization proceedings initiated by the Germans. In 1942, compulsory registration was introduced affecting all people from 15 to SO. Non-registration was to be punished.41 In February of 1943, Lohse issued an appeal urging Lithuanians to volunteer for the Lithuanian (S. S.) Legion. On February 26, Adrian von Renteln, Lohse's deputy for Lithuania, supplemented the appeal. The registration of volunteers, which was to begin on March 1, turned out to be a fiasco. In retaliation, the German authorities began closing Lithuanian universities and arresting many persons. In a sense, the Germans used a carrot-and-stick approach. Volunteers were promised the restoration of private property.42 In turn, the Lithuanian underground paper Nepriklausoma Lietuva warned the people to disregard Nazi mobilization orders and not to register for the Legion.43 On March 20, 1943, "The Kauener Zeitung," referring to the Lithuanian legion, spoke of opposition by irresponsible Lithuanian intellectuals.44

Yet the Germans did not give up trying to get the Lithuanians "on the right track." In Kaunas, the German General Just appealed to Lithuanians to enlist at least in work battalions, which were part of the Todt-organization. Registration was to be applicable for all males from 18 to 45, and noncompliance was to be punished by fines and jail sentences. On the other hand, no coercion was needed to find recruits for the Plechavičius Home Army. Plechavičius, a Lithuanian general, was interested in re-establishing an autonomous Lithuanian army, primarily for the purpose of fighting the Soviet Russians. As far as the German authorities were concerned, the Plechavičius troops were merely a militia for preserving internal security. The Germans were determined to prevent the growth of independent Lithuanian military contingents. In May, 1944, Von Renteln notified Plechavičius that his Lithuanian units "were accepted into the Waffen S. S." When Plechavičius protested, Von Renteln rescinded his note, or to be more precise, his order. This, however, did not end the controversy; Plechavičius and his chief of staff, Colonel Urbonas, were arrested and deported to Germany.46

Virtually all Germans in Lithuania enjoyed the privileges of masters. Whereas Lithuanians in most instances merely "administered" their own property, Germans were given full ownership rights. All real estate that had been nationalized by the Russians was taken over by the "Ostland Incorporated" agencies.47 Moreover, by the end of 1943, about 50,000 German colonists, as well as Dutch and Danes, were settled in Lithuania. As a result, many Lithuanian "administrators" were displaced from their holdings.48 By a special decree German citizens and ethnic Germans were granted extraterritorial rights within the Baltic states. Therefore, misdemeanors and crimes committed by Germans were in most instances tried by German courts.49 Furthermore, Germans received substantially higher food rations than Lithuanians.50 This, however, did not bother the Lithuanians too much, since food was available without ration cards in the flourishing black markets as well as from farmers, who supplied friends and relatives in the towns.

In conclusion, it can be stated that to some extent the Nazi policies in Lithuania were based on ideas of Germanization developed prior to 1933. The interest in Germanization was first displayed during World War I. It was at that time too that German cultural superiority was stressed. The Nazis accepted the above assertions, but wanted "to purify the race" at the same time. Thus, the idea of exterminating undesirables was a new phenomenon, unless one were to argue that the mass slaughter of the ancient Prussians by the Teutonic Knights in the Middle Ages could be viewed as the antecedent force of cruelty. This, however, might be reductio ad absurdum. Yet, the Baltic German, Rosenberg, to his bitter end displayed ideas which showed his close identification with traditional German projects, geared to the annexation of the Baltic lands. On the eve of his execution in Nuremberg, Rosenberg probably still held the views which he wrote down in his last book while in prison. Lithuania, according to him, was an unfortunate obstacle between Germany and the rest of the Baltic territories. A German Reich beginning in Aachen and ending at Lake Peipus in Estonia would have prevented the German collapse in World War I and II.51 Theories of this type perhaps best explain the rather provincial and mediocre mentality of Rosenberg. For the sake of expediency, because of administrative inefficiency and rivalries between certain key Nazis, Rosenberg's projects in Ostland could not be implemented. Had the Germans won the war, the dichotomy of European and strictly German interests inherent in the official Nazi pronouncements would most likely have been solved by eliminating the emphasis on a "Greater Europe." It was this dichotomy which was evident to any intelligent observer in the Baltic states and elsewhere.

Furthermore, German authorities in Ostland lacked a rigid chain of command. Hitler was remotely in charge, Rosenberg was the official boss in Eastern Europe, but for practical purposes it was Lohse who ran affairs in Ostland, according to his own judgment. To confuse the situation even further, military and S. S. pressure groups further thwarted the formulation of more precise policies. If in the final analysis Hitler was an arbiter and judge, the existing tug-of-war between personalities with slightly different ideological views was conducive to anarchy, since the pressure groups operated not only in Berlin but also on the spot in Ostland. This phenomenon was certainly observed by the Baits and perhaps induced them not to take German administrators too seriously.

In both World Wars, by pursuing friendly policies toward the natives in the Baltic area, the Germans might have capitalized on the anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiments, respectively. By displaying attitudes of superiority and by economic exploitation the Germans made many enemies in both instances.52


1    Börje Colliander, Die Beziehungen zwischen Litauen und Deutschland während der Okkupation 1915-1918, Publ. Dissertation (Humanities Faculty: Äbo Academy, 1935), p. 82.
2    Ibid., p. 91.
3    Ibid., p. 98.
4    Cf. Hermann Rauschning, Die Revolution des Nihilismus, shortened ed. by Golo Mann (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1964), p. 242.
5    Ibid.
6    Ibid., p. 259.
7    As printed in Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1942 (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1951), p. 446.
8    Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (München: Eher-Verlag, 1939), pp. 428-29.
9    Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aus-senpolitik (München: Eher-Verlag, 1927), p. 20.
10    Thomas G. Chase, The Story of Lithuania (New York: Stratford House, 1946), p. 303.
11    Peter Kleist, Die Europäische Tragödie (Göttingen: Schütz, 1961), p. 151. This is a slightly revised edition of his former work Zwischen Hitler und Stalin. The author, in his introduction to Tragödie displays a stronger commitment to Nazi Germany than was possible in the edition published in 1950. He stated ironically that his book will displease those 90% of the German people who were always 'for it" and those 90% "who were always against it.
12    Ibid., p. 152
13    Ibid.
14    Ibid., p. 150
15    Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (London: McMillan), p. 184.
16    Günter Schubert, Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Aussen-politik (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1963), pp. 125-37.
17    Kleist, op. cit., p. 147.
18    Picker, op. cit., p. 238.
19    Lietuvių Enciklopedija (The Lithuanian Encyclopedia) (Boston, 1960), hereafter referred to as LE, Vol. XXI, p. 238.
20    Ibid., pp. 238-39.
21    Ibid., p. 238.
22    According to Deutsche Zeitung in Ostland, April 3, 1942, as reported in Lithuanian Legation, Current News on the Lithuanian Situation (Washington, D. C.), hereafter referred to as CN, No. 7(19), July 28, 1942.
23    Walter Zimmermann, "Mit Alfred Rosenberg durchs Ostland," Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, No. 147, June 1942, p. 380.
24    As printed in CN, No. 6, September 30, 1941.
25    Heinrich Lohse, "Ostland baut auf," Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, No. 142, January 1942, pp. 34-35.
26    Ibid., p. 39.
27    CN, No. 5(17), May 20, 1942.
28    CN, No. 2(14), February 16, 1942.
29    CN, No. 7(31), July 1943.
30    Entry on Mar. 16, 1942, in Louis P. Lochner (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries (New York: Eagle Books, 1948), p. 151.
31    Kleist, op. cit., p. 155.
32    Ibid., pp. 153-54.
33    Ibid., p. 156.
34    Ibid., p. 158.
35    Ibid., p. 156.
36    Ibid., p. 159.
37    LE, Vol XXI, p. 240.
38    Kleist, op. cit., p. 159.
39    Letter from S. S. General Gottlob Berger to Heinrich Himmler, Berlin-Charlottenburg, March 9, 1943, as printed in Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf (eds.), Das Dritte Reich und seine Denker (Berlin-Grunewald: Verlags Gmbh., 1959), p. 30.
40    Kleist, op. cit., p. 158.
41    CN, No. 1(13), January 31, 1942.
42    CN, No. 6(30), June 1943.
43    CN, No. 8(32), August 1943.
44    CN, No. 6(30), June 1943.
45    Ibid.
46    CN, No. 8(44), August 1944.
47    CN, No. 6(30), June 1943.
48    CN, No. 8(44), August 1944.
49    CN, No. 10, November 30, 1941.
50    CN, No. 7(19), July 28, 1942.
51    Serge Lang & Ernest von Schenck (eds.), Porträit eines Menschheitsverbrechers (St. Gallen: Zöllihofer & Co., 1947), p. 297.
52    In addition to the sources cited above, the following also provided useful information on the problem: Otto Dietrich, Zwölf Jahre mit Hitler (München: Isar Verlag, 1955); Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, 2 vols. (Neustadt- Aisch: Shcmidt, 1962 - 63); F. Th. Hart, Alfred Rosenberg. Der Mann und sein Werk, second edition (München: J. F. Lehmann, 1933); Kurt Pritzkoleit, Das kommandierte Wunder (München: Verlag Desch, 1959); Alfred Ericih Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Hans-Günther Seraphim (ed.), Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956); Louis L. Snyder, German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co., 1952).