Volume 29, No.1 - Spring 1983
Editor of this issue: Antanas Klimas
ISSN 0024-5089
Copyright © 1983 LITUANUS Foundation, Inc.


Monmouth College

In the nineteenth century scholars disagreed about the location of the castle of St. George that was a central feature in the campaign that led to the battle of Durben in 1260. Eventually the discussion died for lack of firm evidence, and most scholars accepted the suggestion that St. George be identified with Jurbarkas (Georgenburg) on the Nemunas (Memel) River. This contention, however, is doubtful, because logic suggests that St. George could not have been located there.

The explanation is complex, but following it is worthwhile, because it elucidates the problems facing the Christians and pagans who confronted each other at the southeast corner of the Baltic, struggling for dominion and survival in a critical decade of Lithuanian history.

The military situation in the 1250's was unstable: German crusaders were advancing from the north out of Livonia through Semgallia and Kurland toward Samogitia; these crusaders, led by the Teutonic Knights, were continuing a quest begun by the Order of Swordbrothers, which had been destroyed at the battle of the Saule in 1236 in their major effort to conquer the stout pagans or the Samogitian lowlands. Another major force of Teutonic Knights was advancing from the east out of Prussia and had just occupied Samland with the aid of the Bohemian king and numerous German crusaders; traditionally they had counted on the aid of the northern Polish dukes, who were advancing on the Sudovian pagans on a parallel course, south and somewhat east of the German line of march. The two German forces had come together at Memel (Klaipeda), but they did not have the resources for an effective occupation of the wilderness region that lay inland.1

The practice at this time for a crusader advance was to wear down resistance by ravaging the countryside — stealing cattle, burning down villages, and capturing the people — which was essentially the same method of warfare used at home in Germany, France, and Italy. As soon as possible the invaders built a base inside the enemy lands and sallied forth from that secure haven to harass their opponents more effectively. Each advance, however, was followed by a pause to organize a new government: to install advocates who would lead the militia, to build churches for the missionary priests (often Dominicans), and to collect taxes. Also, secure fortifications would be built on the frontier toward the pagans to protect the new converts from raiding parties — they would be especially targeted because everyone assumed that those native forces would provide the bulk of the manpower in future wars.

The relatively few crusaders involved in the border raids were usually decisive in pitched combat. They had superior weapons — chain mail and crossbows — and technical knowledge — especially in the construction of castles; they could transport supplies and war materials from central Europe; and they could communicate relatively easily by land and sea; but, most of all, they had skills at organizing that allowed them to make maximum use of all their resources — the tactics of a western army made the fighting men more effective than were much larger numbers of native warriors in pitched battle. The odds were even, or reversed, in the forests. Nevertheless, at this moment the crusaders were able to make war on their terms and the native nobles were uncertain as to the proper ways of combating them; consequently, many were submitting to the foreign rule, saving thereby their lands and privileges.

This being the situation in that part of western Lithuania called Samogitia (Žemaiten, Samaiten, Lith. Žemaičiai), the Teutonic Order was on the verge of military victory in its advance against the handful of tribes which remained pagan, and, moreover, they had reason to hope for the peaceful conversion of the remaining tribes and their incorporation into the system of medieval states. This was because Mindaugas had just been crowned King of Lithuania. This assumption of royal authority had been highly unpopular among the nobles of the outlying tribes and had not been recognized by the Samogitians. The monarch, eager to eliminate resistance and rivals, and also to make friends with the seemingly invincible crusaders, gave the Samogitian region to the westerners.2 German attacks upon the settlements there caused the native leaders to seek a truce, but not before they had inflicted a defeat on a small crusader force near Memel, wounding the Livonian Master, Burchard of Hornhusen. The crusader leaders, in hope of bringing about a peaceful conversion of the tribes, agreed to a two year truce in 1257.3 Then they concentrated on organizing their regimes in Prussia and Livonia, using a combination of imported advocates and priests and the councils of clan leaders that was supposed to guarantee the propagation of the Gospel and the collection of taxes that the Germans thought important and also a local voice in affairs that the native nobles considered vital.

The campaign that led to the building of St. George began after the crusader-Samogitian truce lapsed in 1259. The pagan Samogitians, apparently reorganized and under competent leadership, fell on the exposed Kurish communities and wrought such death and destruction that the Teutonic Knights were urged to take steps to halt the raids. The usual retaliatory raids were not successful, however, and the constant military service and extraordinary taxes that were required from the nearby Semgallians provoked that people to revolt from the lose Christian overlordship. As the situation worsened, Master Burchard of Hornhusen asked his knights for advice; they proposed a systematic reduction of the rebel lands. Subsequently, Master Burchard called up the Danish vassals from Estonia and all the native tribes in Livonia for the expedition, marched into the rebel country, and built a castle at Doblen in central Semgallia, within reach of relief forces from Mitau and Goldingen.4 The author of the Rhymed Chronicle does not describe the apparently simultaneous construction of a castle on a hill in the province of Karšova (Karschowen, Karschauen), which was probably built in hope of preventing the Samogitians from sending aid to the Semgallian rebels. The raids on the fields and villages from this base, named for the patron saint of the crusaders, St. George, then caused the Lithuanians to complain:

"Sir Death has burdened us with these foreigners, who do us all manner of injury. Let us devise ways of plucking their feathers." So the Lithuanians raised an army for a journey to Karschauen.5

That description by the author of the Rhymed Chronicle was recorded thirty years after the event had occurred; a second telling of the tale came after a lapse of another forty years; when the Prussian chronicler, Peter of Dusburg, wrote:

At this time in Livonia the Master was Burchard of Hornhusen, who had been called from Prussia and sent to the Livonian brothers as Master. And since he knew much about both regions and was considered a gracious gentleman by everyone, in 1259 he arranged that the brothers of Livonia and Prussia build a castle in the land of Karschowen on Mt. St. George, sharing equally the expenses and the labor.6

Of the two accounts, the later one (Peter of Dusburg) is much more detailed and complete than the earlier Rhymed Chronicle, a surprising occurrence because the author of the Rhymed Chronicle was much better informed about events in Kurland which had occurred during his own lifetime than was Peter, who lived later and who lived in a more distant land. The Rhymed Chronicle does not mention a visit by the Livonian Master to Prussia before 1260 nor an arrangement to share expenses and labor; the latter point would have required a formal treaty. This disparity of color and detail continued in the description of the campaign that was organized to bring supplies to the outpost at St. George. The description in the Rhymed Chronicle is as follows:

Master Burckhardt von Hornhausen rode to Prussia in order to insure that pure Christianity would not suffer defeat. . . and the Marshal came out to meet the Master of Livonia. He told him his situation and why he had come there. He asked the brothers if they would undertake a journey to Karschauen. They all rejoiced at the request . . . The Marshal assigned Brothers from Prussia to the expedition, and they traveled without interruption to Memel. It was none too soon. Meanwhile a splendid, well-armed army from Livonia approached along the seashore.7

Peter of Dusburg's account reads much better:

In the year 1260 the brothers of Livonia and Prussia came with great armies to carry supplies to the brothers at the castle of St. George; and when they had approached the castle, a messenger came, saying that four thousand Lithuanians had invaded a territory in Kurland to burn, pillage, and spill Christian blood, and that they were leading away women and children and all their booty. Hearing this, the brothers and all the army girded for battle so that the Christian souls could be saved from the hands of the enemy; and a certain Pomesanian noble named Matto, the son of Pepin, when asked by the Marshal, brother Henry, how they should attack the enemy, he said, "Let us leave our horses behind us, because if the commoners have no horses they will have to fight; otherwise, they will surely flee." But this counsel was rejected by the knights of the Danish king from Reval and others, who said that because of their heavy armor they could not fight without horses. And then the Kurs pleaded humbly that, if God should give them victory, their wives and children be returned to them. The brothers were willing to agree to this, but the commoners from Prussia and Livonia spoke against it and demanded that the captives be divided according to the customs of war.8

The crusader army intercepted the pagan raiders at Durben. The Kurs withdrew from the line of battle just as the fighting was beginning and precipitated a general flight among the native auxiliaries. The Teutonic Knights stood and fought until they were overwhelmed. Subsequently, the Kurs revolted and so occupied the attention of the Teutonic Knights that it was impossible to make another attempt to resupply St. George. Eventually, that isolated garrison was compelled by hunger to abandon the castle and slip away to Memel.9 In addition to these two literary sources, there are three documents which mention Karšova. Each includes it in a list of Samogitian territories, which indicates that it was considered a geographic region rather than a particular castle site.10 That does not resolve the question "where is St. George located," however, because scholars are not in agreement even as to where Karšova is to be found.11

Most scholars believe Karšova to lie south and east of the Kurland province of Ceklis and north and east of the Prussian province of Scalowia; therefore, that it is a rather southerly part of Samogitia, the most distant from Semgallia. And they follow Max Toeppen, Dusburg's editor, who revised the traditional location of Mt. St. George near Doblen, to identify it with Jurbarkas on the Nemunas River.12 That, however, presents certain problems:

1) It is perhaps too daring an idea to think that the Livonian Knights, plagued by a revolt in Semgallia and raids into Kurland, would hope to stop these by making a gigantic flanking movement via the Nemunas River to the rear of the Samogitians? That is a long journey to ask the Estonian vassals and native auxiliaries to undertake annually in order to resupply the garrison.

A look at the map demonstrates the physical difficulty of bringing mounted troops and infantry from Estonia and Livonia past Memel and up the banks of the Nemunas — compared to bringing a force along the seashore into Kurland and then proceeding inland in the company of a force from Prussia that came north from Memel. Although Master Burckhardt had been commander at Koenigsberg and, therefore was familiar with the Nemunas valley, he was also familiar with the Kurland frontiers. The importance of his Prussian experience is his ability to arrange for the cooperation of the Prussian commanders, not his knowledge of the geography.

2) Was the distance too great from Jurbarkas to Durben for the campaign to have occurred as Peter of Dusburg described? In both accounts of the campaign, the armies met near Memel (the mouth of the gulf was always meant by the word "Memel"). If the armies had proceeded almost to Jurbarkas before the messenger arrived, the news would have had to travel 150-200 kilometers to notify the army, and the crusaders would have had to make a forced march of that distance to reach Durben before the enemy vanished.

The feasibility of this is problematical. Although there are few studies of military techniques in Livonia, the ones that exist indicate that most raids lasted but a few days so that the raiders could escape before the native militia could gather and pursue them. The rule was: the larger the force, the longer it could intimidate the defensive forces and remain in the country, moving from one locality to another to plunder. This force of 4000 warriors was a large one, but not the largest that had ever come into Kurland. Probably it did not remain a week in enemy country.13

If the crusader army had already proceeded to the neighborhood of Jurbarkas, it would have had to retrace its route to Memel and proceed along the shore to Kurland, then go inland in order to intercept the Samogitians. The direct route lay across wild and practically roadless hostile territory and would have taken several days.

A comparison of the travel time required for the two armies indicates that it would be theoretically possible to march from near Jurbarkas to Durben in time to rescue the column of Kurish prisoners, but it would have necessitated a hurried march and raised some doubt about the crusaders' ability to arrive in time. But apparently the traditions that the chroniclers followed did not consider these points important. In the discussion about strategy everyone was so certain that they could reach the enemy force in time that they abandoned their original mission practically within sight of its accomplishment and discussed the military tactics, the division of the booty, and a proposal that they proceed on foot. In short, the story would be more credible if the distance were far shorter than the 150-200 kilometers that the army would have had to march between Jurbarkas and Durben.

3) It would seem unlikely that a garrison fleeing a desperate situation would choose to go past the blockading fort and through Samogitian occupied lands to Memel, when it could more easily reach crusader occupied lands in Scalovia and Samland. A troop escaping from a castle in the more northerly interior would be closer to Memel than to any other border fortress.14

The conclusion drawn from this is that Peter of Dusburg's story may be incorrect in its details. Not being familiar with the wilderness north of the Nemunas River, he may have assumed that a St. George castle named by the Livonian knights was identical with that St. George's (Georgenburg) later founded by the Prussian knights. It was a common practice to duplicate names of saints in the regional fortresses of the Teutonic Order; for example, Frauenburg in Livonia and Prussia, Marienburg in both lands, and so forth. Two St. Georges were existing in Prussia, and in Livonia there was a famous guildhouse named for the saint. There was a tradition, therefore, that would logically permit a Livonian St. George to exist simultaneously with the Prussian St. George that lay on the north bank of the Nemunas. Therefore, it is quite likely that the castle named St. George lay with the boundaries of the province of Karšova, but at the opposite end of the country from Jurbarkas. That would explain the speed at which the scouts located the crusader force and the general confidence that the army could intercept the raiding party. This is no new contention. All historians before Toeppen believed that the castle of St. George lay further north than Jurbarkas, but afterward, when all maps identified that castle as St. George's, Toeppen's view became dominant. And, subsequently, it was necessary to locate the province of Karšova in the southern part of Samogitia. The implications of this are obvious.

Archeologists have demonstrated that significant settlements once existed in the lands south of Semgallia and east of Kurland, a region that later became wilderness — depopulated in the border wars of the late thirteenth century. Over six hundred ancient and medieval walled forts have been located in Lithuania (and perhaps two hundred more lie beneath towns, fields, and cemeteries), of which only about seventy have been excavated — some by nineteenth century amateurs. Significantly, the least investigated region is that northwestern part of the country that is of importance to the question posed in this article.15

It is time, therefore, to reopen the question, to confront the problem of locating the castle of St. George. I believe that it lay inland from Memel, either on the upper reaches of the Windau River or the Akmena River. A castle there could monitor the Lithuanian raids into Kurland and Semgallia and serve as a base for attacks into Karšova; it would be easier to reach from Livonia.

Unfortunately, we cannot expect too much help from the archaeologists. It would be a matter of great luck for a scientist to find evidence of a church or implements of war that would prove a particular site to have been occupied by the crusaders at that time. A hurriedly constructed fort of logs and earth, such as St. George must have been, would not necessarily have been significantly different from native fortifications. Since the Lithuanians were a preliterate society, we cannot expect to uncover any artifacts that would allow us to identify any particular settlement by name. The fact that is important is that villages and forts stood in regions later renowned as dangerous, almost uninhabited forest and swamp. Archaeologists can prove the extent of occupation and identify the culture of the inhabitants and, by radioactive dating, give an outline history of the site. Since artifacts cannot speak, this does not always allow an unequivocal identification of the people — thus the evidence of the spade is as inconclusive as that of the literary sources.

We must make do with guesses. There never has been agreement as to the ethnic identity of the peoples living in this region.16 Clean-cut lines of race, language, and culture are rarely found anywhere; and this part of the Baltic was one of those corners where several distinct cultures and languages merged. We may treat the Karšova inhabitants as Lithuanian or Samogitian, as did the Teutonic Order, but we should remember that the population fled the area, to be resettled further inland.17 Later chroniclers, we may assume, were more concerned with the contemporaneous location of a tribe than with its region of origin. They were certainly not interested in a study of tribal ethnology — the scouts knew each tribe by its characteristic speech, dress, and customs, but they wrote no books. The "Wegebericht," which described the routes into the various provinces, is only an outline that permits us to glimpse into the crusaders' lines of march. By the 1390's, when the "Wegebericht" was composed, Karšova took three days to reach from Memel. The direction of travel is only vaguely indicated and the extent of the settlement area is not described at all. It may be that the land called Karšova is poorly defined because its boundaries shifted as the inhabitants moved repeatedly to safer locations.18 This change in the location of the territory naturally misled historians to accept Toeppen's identification of St. George with Jurbarkas and Karšova as a southerly province of Samogitia.

Where the castle of St. George stood may never be known. The log and earth fortifications were doubtless destroyed in 1260 or 1261 and never rebuilt. The Teutonic Knights themselves forgot the location. No one in the fourteenth century had a reason to seek out the true location. The mapmakers had to make their best guesses, which tended to alternate between a southern and northern location for Karsova, which in turn determined the possible location for the castle of St. George.19


What then does this story show? If St. George was indeed located in a more northerly part of Samogitia, then we must conclude that the military confrontation in the year 1260 was still limited to the borderlands of territories occupied by the crusaders before 1257. In effect, the Teutonic Order was principally concerned with suppressing the rebels in Semgallia and restoring order in Kurland. The Livonian master was not involved in a daring and ambitious project of conquest, as would be implied by constructing a castle deep in the rear of his Samogitian opponents. That was the step

the Teutonic Order took in the 1290's, after the pacification of the Semgallian tribes, the defeat of the Sudovians, and the expulsion of other tribes from the bordering lands. The Order was not ready for that step in 1259-1260.

The Teutonic Order intended from very early on to insure communication lines between Prussia and Livonia. That was the reason that Memel was occupied in 1252. As noted above, the Christian leaders soon afterward obtained title from King Mindaugas to the Samogitia territories inland from Memel. As late as 1337 this was the extent of their territorial claims (with one document also listing Aukstaiten) and between 1390 and 1410 that was the extent of the physical occupation.20 It is understandable that historians, particularly those accustomed to Clausewitzian strategy and the study of maps, would see a sweeping pincer movement in a campaign to Jurbarkas. However, that was a misunderstanding of thirteenth century strategy and of the practical abilities of the armies of that era. The crusaders were limited in their vision of what was possible and in their abilities to act. They moved step-by-step, occupying one region after another, motivated perhaps by necessity to defend previous conquests as much as by aggressive intents.

The crusaders had aggressive intents — unless a native ruler could make himself king and declare himself a Christian (crusaders believed in royal government as the only kind recognized by God) — but they were also cautious arid pragmatic in their military ambitions. If in this situation they observed those same practices, then we should reconsider the traditional identification of Mt. St. Goerge with Jurbarkas and the generally accepted story of the 1260 campaign that led to the historic battle at Durben.


1 William Urban, The Baltic Crusade (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1975) and The Prussian Crusade (Washington: University Press of America, 1980); Eric Christersen, The Northern Crusades (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
2 Liv-, Est-, und Kurlaendisches Urkundenbuch, I, 1 (ed. Georg von Bunge. Dorpat: Laakmann, 1853. rpt. Aalen: Scientia, 1967), pp. 333-334; Johannes Totoraitis, Die Litauer unter dem Koenig Mindaugas bis zum lahre 1263 (Freiburg/Schweiz: St. Paulus, 1905), pp. 62-75; Manfred Hellmann, "Der Deutsche Orden in der Koenigskronung Mindaugas," and Zenonas Ivinskis, "Mindaugas und seine Krone," in Zeitschrift fuer Ostforschung, 3 (1954).
3 Livländische Reimchronik (ed. Leo Meyer. Hildesheim: Olms, 1963, reprint of 1876 edition), pp. 120-5.
4 William Urban, "The Military Occupation of Semgallia in the Thirteenth Century," Baltic History (1975), pp. 25-26.
5 Translation by Jerry Smith and William Urban, The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Publications, 1977. Volume 128 of the Uralic and Altaic Series), p. 71. Livländische Reimchronik, pp. 126-127:sie sprachen, "hat uns der mort
mit disen gesten uberladen,
die uns alien enden schaden!
wir wollen in manchen stucken
in die vederen pflucken."
Zu hant ein her bereitet wart
der Lettowen uf die vart
zu Karschowen drate.
da buweten sie mit rate
eine starke burc da vor.
Robert Krumbholtz, "Samaiten und der Deutsche Orden bis zum Frieden am Melno-See," in Altpreussisches Monatsheft, 26 (1889), p. 228, assumes that St. George was built before the expiration of the truce.
6 "Chronicon Terrae Prusiae von Peter von Dusburg," in Scriptores rerum Prussicarum (ed. Max Toeppen. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1861), I, 95-96:
Hoc tempore fuit in partibus Lyvonie magister frater Burgardus de Hornhusen, que assumptus de terra Prussie, datus fuit fratribus Lyvonie in magistrurn. Hic quia noticiam plenam habuit utriusque terre, et tanquam homo affabilis in omnium oculis fuerat graciosus, ordinavit, quod sub equalibus expensis et laboribus fratrum de Lyvonia et Prussia edificabatur anno domimi MCCLIX castrum in terra Carsovie in monte sancti Georgii, quod tune fuit summe necessarium ad incrementum fidei Cristiane. Quo edificato, relicti fuerunt ibi viri legales et experti in armis, fratres et armigeri de Prussia et Lyvonia pro custodia dicti castri.
7 Translation by Smith-Urban, p. 70; Livlandische Reimchronik, pp. 127-128:
Under disen dingen,
daz nicht misselingen
orfte der reinen cristenheit
von Horhhusen meister Burkart reit
hin kein Pruzen drate.
. . .
do er quam in daz lant,
von bruderen wart er zu hant
lieplich und wol entpfangen.
der marschalk quam gegangen
zu dem meistere von Nieflant.
der tet im sine sache bekant,
war umme er was kommen dar.
er bat die brudere, daz ist war,
daz sie wolden eine vart
varen kein Karschowen wart.
der bete waren sie vil vro. 
. . .
von dem marschalk wart gelesen
von Pruzen brudere uf die vart.
Sus vuren sie ungespart 
vaste kein der Memele zu. 
ez was wol zu mazen vru. 
Under des von Nieflande 
bie des meres strande 
quam ein wunneclichez her 
vil wol bereitet zu der wer.
8 "Chronicon Terrae Prussia," pp. 96-97:
Anno domini MCCLX fratres de Lyvonia et Prussia cum validis exercitibus ad deferenda vitualia fratribus de castro sancti Georgii convenerunt, et dum approprinquarent huic castro, venit nuncius, qui dixit, quod IIII milia Lethovinorum vastassent quandam partem terre Curonie per incendium et rapinam et effusionem multi sanguinis Cristiani, et mulieres et parvulos captos cum multa alia preda deducerent. Quo audito, dum fratres et lotus exercitus se prepararent ad pugnam, ut animas Cristi sanguine dedemptas de manibus hostium liberarent, quidam de Pomesania nobilis dictus Matto, filius Pipini, dum ab eo frater Henricus Marscalcus quereret, quomodo aggrediendi essent hostes, ait: relinquamus equos nostros longe a nobis, ut non sit nobis spes redeundi ad eos, et accedamus pedestres ad ipsos, sicque populus destitutus auxilio equorum, manebit in prelio, aliter in fugam sine dubio convertetur. Cui consilio milicia regis Dacie de Revalia, et plures alii contradixerunt, asserentes, quod propter gravedinem armorum non possent durare in bello sine equis.
9 Livländische Reimchronik, pp. 133-134.
10 Preussisches Urkundenbuch, I, 1 (ed. Rudolf Phillipi and Carl Peter Woelky. Koenigsberg: Hartung, 1882), p. 206; and I, 2 (ed. August Seraphim. Koenigsberg: Hartung, 1909), pp. 33-37, 336.
11 Ibid., II, 33: "Die Lage der aus den preussischen Littauerkaempfen bekannten Landschaft Karsowe ist verschieden angegeben, waehrend Totoraitis sie in der Gegend von Georgenburg an der Memel sucht, will Ketrynski sie mit Korszow, oestlich der Okmiana, identificieren." See further Hans and Gertrude Mortensen, Die Besiedlung des nordoestlicrien Ostpreussen bis zum Beginn des 77. Jahrhunderts, II (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1938), pp. 183-201.
12 "Chronicon Terrae Prussiae," footnote to p. 96, in which he argued that the 1259 treaty with Mindaugas, giving the Teutonic Knights Sudovia, Schlauen, and Samogitia was proof that the crusaders were highly interested in the southern territories on both sides of the Nemunas River. This interest, he believed, would have been accompanied by military expeditions into those territories. This argument is generally accepted. Krumbholtz, pp. 228-232 and Anton Salys, Die žemaitischen Mundarten, part 1 of Geschichte des žemaitischen Sprachgebiets (Kaunas: 1930), pp. 45-46. See the Lietuvių Enciklopedija (Boston: Lietuvių Enciklopedijos leidykla, 1954) see Vanda Sruogienė, "Ceklis," III, 445-447; Adolfas Šapoka, "Karšuva," XI, 97-99; Zenonas Ivinskis, "Jurbarkas," X, 116-122.
13 Friedrich Benninghoven, "Zu Technik spaetmittelalterlicher Feldzuege in Ostbaltikum," Zeitschrift fuer Ostforschung, 19 (1970), 631-651; William Urban, "The Organization of the Defense of the Livonian Frontier in the Thriteenth Century," Speculum, 48 (1973), 525-532.
14 "Chronicon Terrae Prussiae," p. 96.
15 A. Tautavičius, Lietuvos TSR archeologijos atlasas II (Vilnius: Mintis, 1975).
16 Hans and Gertrude Mortensen, pp. 183f.
17 Ibid., pp. 199-201.
18 "Die littauischen Wegebericht," Scriptores rerum Prusiicarum, I. 664-708.
19 Valdis Zeps, who has made a reputation for his work the study of early maps (combined with literary and linguistic research), reviewed the cartographic evidence for me in 1977. He noted that one early mapmaker, Kiparski, located Karšova on the Couronian Lagoon between the mouths of the Akmena and Minija — a site very suitable for the campaign as envisioned in this article.
20 William Uban, "The Prussian-Lithuanian Frontier of 1242," in Lituanus, 21 (1975), No. 4, 5-18; and "The Correct Translation of 'Ruce'," in Journal of Baltic Studies, 13 (1982), pp. 12-18.