Volume 30, No.2 - Summer 1984
Editor of this issue: Thomas Remeikis
ISSN 0024-5089
Copyright © 1984 LITUANUS Foundation, Inc.


 Lithuanian Research and Studies Center

Although the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied by the Red Army and incorporated into the Soviet Union 44 years ago, the region has retained its unique character and is still not completely integrated into the Soviet system. The distinctiveness of the Baltic region is due to a number of historical factors and manifests itself in different ways.

First, linguistic and religious differences exist between inhabitants of this area and the rest of the Soviet population. The religious heritage of the Baltic region is Western and non-Orthodox. Estonia and Latvia are predominately Lutheran countries with close traditional ties to northern Germany and Scandinavia. Lithuania has the distinction of being the only republic in the Soviet Union with a predominately Roman Catholic population.

The Baltic peoples are linguistically different from the rest of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. Lithuanian and Latvian are closely related Indo-European languages which have very little in common with Slavic. Estonian is a Finno-Ugric language related to Finnish and Hungarian. All three Baltic languages use the Latin script — in marked contrast to the Cyrillic script which is used by almost all the other peoples of the Soviet Union. As pointed out by

Helene Carrare d'Encause, "for the Baltic peoples, Russian is really a foreign language, not a related one."1

The religious and linguistic distinctiveness of the Baltic republics is accentuated by the fact that all three countries between 1918 and 1940 were independent and sovereign political entities. The legacy of political, economic and cultural independence continues to permeate the consciousness of the Baltic peoples, their life styles, and their material achievement. There is a certain pride among the Baltic peoples and a conscious effort to maintain ones individuality and Western orientation vis-a-vis the drab reality of Soviet life. This attribute of the Baltic peoples tends to capture the attention of the few Western correspondents who have been in the Baltic region.

Robin Knight, former US News and World Report's Moscow bureau chief, noted that "Vilna [Vilnius], once center of a feudal kingdom, is the most 'Western' Soviet city. Its long-haired teenagers in jeans and Scandinavian-made T-shirts would look at home in Western Europe or America. Women are stylishly dressed, and homes and gardens reflect more careful maintenance than is usual in Russia."2 Writing in The Atlantic magazine, William Atwood points out that "in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, even after thirty-five years of Soviet domination, it is still possible, up to a point, to tell that you're in Europe. The medieval and Renaissance castles and churches, the cobbled streets, the Germanic architecture and Scandinavian decor, the jeans, T-shirts, and rock music, all contribute to the illusion."3

Given the distinctiveness of the Baltic States, a basic task facing Soviet authorities was and still remains the transformation of Baltic society according to their developmental model. In terms of Marxist-Leninist thinking, the basis of this transformation is found in the economic sphere, and was predicated on the collectivization of agriculture and accelerated development of industry. It was believed that these twin measures would not only integrate the economies of the Baltic States with that of the Soviet Union, but would also promote socialist internationalism — the development and drawing together of the various ethnic groups into one Soviet people whose language of communication would be Russian.

Industrialization did not bring about the realization of socialist internationalism. Nationalistic feelings and manifestations are strong in all three Baltic republics. Nevertheless, industrialization did have a major impact on population change, and especially on the ethnic structure of the region. Given the resistance of Baits to adoption of internationalistic attitudes and acknowledgement of the primacy of Russian language and culture, changes in the ethnic structure may ultimately achieve what propagation of socialist internationalism failed — the Russification of the Baltic region. This aspect of the industrialization process merits a closer examination.

Industrialization and Economic Integration

The accelerated industrial development of the Baltic region was mandated by imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and shaped by the geographical realities of the area. The poverty of the region's industrial resource base became a key factor determining the direction of industrial development. With the exception of oil shale in the Kohtla-Jarve area in Estonia, the region has no energy resources. Its mineral resources are limited to sedimentary or glacial materials such as clay, sand, gravel, and limestone. This paucity of mineral resources is counterbalanced by a number of positive geographical factors. This includes the coastal location of the region and presence of seaports such as Tallinn, Riga, Ventspils, Liepaja, and Klaipėda. The Baltic region has a climate and soils which are adequate for agriculture, and all three republics have a tradition of excellence in the production of meat and dairy products.

In retrospect, the single most important asset possessed by the Baltic States were its human resources — specifically its pool of skilled and industrious workers. This is especially true of Estonia and Latvia. Both republics have established industrial work traditions dating back to the nineteenth century. Lithuania — in contrast to its two northern neighbors — was a less developed agricultural country with a large rural population. The presence in Lithuania of abundant manpower resources in the countryside made its course of industrial development under the Soviets substantially different from that of Estonia and Lativa.

It can be concluded that the regions meager natural resource endowment coupled with the availability of manpower resources geared the industrialization process toward labor-intensive indus-tires which required minimal inputs of imported raw materials and fuel. Industries in this category included machine-building and metalworking, as well as the light and food processing industries.

These three branches of industry accounted for 75.9 percent (1978) of total industrial production by value in Latvia, 74.3 percent (1978) in Lithuania, and 66.8 percent (1980) in Estonia.4

The machine-building and metalworking industry is the linchpin of the industrialization process. This branch is well suited to the Baltic region since it utilized not only the existing skilled workers, but also absorbed the surplus manpower found in rural areas. The machine-building and metalworking industry is the single largest employer of industrial workers in all three republics. Moreover, employment in this branch continues to grow.5 In 1977, for example, 136,000 persons or 35 percent of all industrial workers in Lithuania were employed in the machine-building and metalworking industry.6 Between 1960 and 1978, the percentage of all workers in Lithuania employed in the branch grew from 22.5 to 36.6 percent — a significant 14.1 percentage points increase. In Estonia during the same period the percentage increase was 9.1 percentage points, and 26.8 percent of all industrial workers in 1978 were found in this branch. Latvia already in 1970 had more than 32 percent of its workers in this sector.7

Machine-building and metalworking enterprises in the Baltic region tend to be large and highly specialized enterprises. For example, the Vilnius Fuel Pump Factory in 1978 employed almost 7,000 workers.8 The Vilnius-based Sigma Industrial Association had almost 14,000 workers. This rapidly growing organization specializes in the manufacture of electronic computers and related equipment.9 Output from these and other enterprises has an All-Union significance, and in terms of Soviet regional development theory, makes it possible for the Baltic republics to participate in the territorial division of labor. In fact, specialized enterprises in the machine-building and metalworking industry represent a key link in integrating the economy of the Baltic region with that of the entire Soviet Union. Consequently, the Baltic republics, while comprising only 2.8 percent of the total population of the USSR, account for a relatively high percentage of the total Soviet output in certain lines of manufacturing.

Latvia in 1978 accounted for 42 percent of the total Soviet output of milking machines, 28 percent of radios and high-fi systems, 27 percent of railroad passenger cars, 22 percent of streetcars, 20 percent of refrigerators, and 15 percent of minibuses. Latvia also produces more than one-half of all Soviet telephones.10 Lithuania has become one of the centers of machine tool production in the Soviet Union (12 percent of total production in 1978). Besides electronic computers, Lithuania also produces televisions, tape recorders, refrigerators, and washing machines.11 Estonia accounts for almost 6 percent of the total Soviet output of electric motors and excavating machines.12  Growth of the machine-building and metalworking industry reflects a certain momentum as well as the fact that almost all the key sub-sectors of the industry are under the jurisdiction of All-Union ministries. Since branch priorities take precedence over territorial considerations and local needs, positive externalities found in the region's cities have in fact become a significant incentive for the further expansion of this sector of industry. It is not surprising that local planners have publicly expressed a sense of frustration over the matter. A Soviet Lithuanian economist has stated that "there is an endeavor to expand enterprises in large cities where it is easier to provide them with skilled labor — and not by training them, but by attracting them from older enterprises and other cities. Most of the industrial enterprises in large cities, and especially machine-building and metalworking enterprises have the ability to expand and increase the size of their labor force. As seen in real life it is very difficult to limit their expansion."13

While the development of specialized industries serving All-Union markets has resulted in a close integration of the economies of the Baltic republics with that of the Soviet Union as a whole, the consumer needs of the local inhabitants have for the most part been ignored. The emphasis on large-scale specialized production has resulted in the almost complete abandonment of production of simple consumer goods — such as can openers, scissors, flashlights, and other everyday necessities. This is due to the fact that most of the small consumer goods in the Soviet Union are produced as auxiliary output in large specialized enterprises. For example, the Western Shipbuilding Yard in Klaipėda also produces parcel post containers and wood broom handles — instead of the more necessary consumer goods.14

The crux of the problem lies in the fact that while enterprises are instructed by their ministries to allocate a certain percent of their budget for the production of consumer goods, they have considerable leeway in determining what product to produce. More often than not, they will ignore consumer needs and produce items which are easy to make.15 Consequently, there is an acute shortage of many everyday necessities in the Baltic region. P. Mickūnas, Minister of Trade of the Lithuanian SSR, pointed out candidly that "we have difficulties in supplying consumers even with items whose production does not require much labor or a sophisticated material-technical base. We could make clippers, pocket knives, wristwatch bands, can openers, thermometers, ax handles, and many more items. These are cheap and very necessary items. But they do not give the producers any economic benefits, and it is necessary to struggle to increase their output."16

Changes in the Ethnic Structure

The most significant and potentially the most ominous consequence of industrialization is found in the demographic sphere. Once labor-intensive industries began to be developed in the Baltic republics, it became very difficult, if not impossible, to stop their growth. This growth depleted local manpower resources, created an acute shortage of labor, and intensified inter-republic migration.

The intensity and character of this problem differs among the three republics. A large rural population in Lithuania made it possible to meet industrial manpower needs using local manpower resources. Between 1951 and 1976 almost 705,000 persons left the countryside and settled in urban areas.17 This massive intra-republic flow of people alleviated the need to use outside manpower resources. Consequently, inter-republic migration to Lithuania was significantly below that to Latvia and Estonia. Net in-migration to Lithuania between 1959 and 1979 totaled only 115,200 persons and accounted for a modest 16.8 percent of its overall population increase.18

The situation in Estonia and Latvia is dramatically different. A lower rate of natural population increase combined with a higher level of urbanization meant that rural areas in both republics could not meet the growing demand for workers in cities. This precipitated a massive influx of migrants from other parts of the Soviet Union. Between 1959 and 1979 inter-republic migration added 261,000 persons to Latvia's population and accounted for 61.1 percent of its population increase. In Estonia net in-migration totaled 117,000 persons and represented 39 percent of its population growth.19

Almost one-half million persons migrated to the Baltic region between 1959 and 1979. This enormous influx of people had a major impact on population growth trends and the ethnic composition of the Baltic republics. In Latvia and Estonia the low rate of natural population increase coupled with the high level of in-migration have created a situation where the eponymous inhabitants are not only in jeopardy of becoming minorities in their own republics, but are in real danger of physical extinction. Helene Carrere d'Encause notes that the Estonians and Latvians, "despite the strength of their national feeling, despite everything distinguishing them historically and culturally from other peoples of the USSR, . . . are headed not toward assimilation, but toward physical extinction. The possible disappearance of nations endowed with such strong personalities is an historic tragedy of which every Balt is conscious, and yet no one seems able to prevent it."20

The Latvian population finds itself in a particularly vulnerable position and will soon experience — if not already — a natural population decrease. Between 1959 and 1979 the size of the Latvian population in Latvia increased by only 55,900 persons or 4.3 percent (see Table 1). Most of this increase occurred during the 1960s. During the 1970s the Latvian population increased by only 12,000 persons or 0.89 percent. It is important to note that during the 1959-1979 period the Latvian population increment accounted for only 13 percent of the republic's overall population growth. The rest of the increase was accounted by Russians, Belorussians, and other ethnic groups. Latvians are no longer a factor in their republic's population growth.

Table 1

Ethnic Group




increase (thousands)

increase as percent of total

increase (thousands)

increase as percent of total

increase (thousands)

increase as percent of total




































Note: Since ethnic population figures were derived from percentages and rounded numbers, the total 1959-1979 increase of 425,000 persons is about 2,600 persons or 0.6 percent below the actual population increase.

Source: V. Stanley Vardys, "Modernization and Baltic Nationalism," Problems of Communism 24 (September-October 1975): 39: and P. Adlys, "Mūsų gyventojai," Mokslas ir gyvenimas. No. 3 (1980), pp. 10-12.

The Estonians are in a slightly better position than the Latvians. Between 1959 and 1979 the number of Estonians living in their republic increased by 55,900 persons or 6.2 percent, and accounted for 20.7 percent of the total population increment (see Table 2). The modest growth of the Estonian population is completely overshadowed by the huge increase in the size of the Russian population living in Estonia. The Russian population between 1959 and 1979 increased by 169.000 persons or 70.3 percent. Russians accounted for 62.8 percent of the republic's total population increment during this period.

Table 2

Ethnic group


Increase as
percent of total







Source: Calculated on basis of data found in Rein Taagepera, "Size and Ethnicity of Estonian Towns and Rural Districts, 1922-1979," lournal of Baltic Studies 13 (Summer 1982): 107.

The Lithuanian population is in a much more favorable situation. Between 1959 and 1979 the Lithuanian population increased by 567,000 persons or 26.4 percent (see Table 3). This percentage increase is six times greater than that for the Latvians and four times greater than that for the Estonians. Lithuanians during this period accounted for 82.6 percent of the republic's total increase. This substantial increase in the number of Lithuanians coupled with their massive rural-urban migration kept the inter-republic migration of Russians and other Soviet nationalities at a low level. Moreover, a large percentage of the interrepublic migration flow to Lithuania — especially during the 1960s — was accounted by Lithuanians returning from exile in Siberia and Kazakhstan. Growth of the Lithuanian population was also furthered by some assimilation of Poles living in the rural areas of eastern Lithuania.

Table 3

Ethnic group Increase
Increase as
percent of total
TOTAL 686.6 100.0

Source: A. Stanaitis and P. Adlys, Lietuvos TSR gyventojai (Vilnius: Mintis, 1973), p. 104; P. Adlys, „Mūsų gyventojai," Mokslas ir gyvenimas, No. 3 (1980), pp. 10-12.

The impact of industrialization on population change in Latvia and Estonia is different from that in Lithuania. The accelerated development of labor-intensive industries in Latvia and Estonia depleted local manpower resources and made the economies of these two republics dependent on outside migrants. The massive influx of immigrants in both republics dramatically decreased the share of the population accounted by the eponymous nationality. The percentage of Estonia's population accounted by Estonians dropped from 74.6 percent in 1959 to 64.7 percent in 1979. The proportion of Latvia's population accounted by Latvians decreased from 62.0 to 53.7 percent.21

If the Latvian percentage continues to decrease at the same rate, then by 1987 Latvians will become a minority population within their own republic. This occurrence will have a devastating psychological impact on the Latvian population. Already in the early 1970s, as pointed out by Juris Dreifelds, "there is a certain unfocused anomie and alienation in the population which seems to have loosened national feelings, pride, and resilience and which may impair group responses to further measures of denationalization."22

Industrialization in Lithuania made it possible to draw into social production the abundant and often underutilized manpower resources found in the countryside. This precipitated a massive rural out-migration which not only satisfied the growing manpower needs of industry, but also reduced the influx of non-eponymous workers. Consequently, Lithuania differs from Latvia and Estonia in that its eponymous inhabitants comprise a large and stable percentage of the republic's population. In fact, the comparative weight of the Lithuanian population between 1959 and 1979 increased from 79.3 to 80.0 percent.23

Industrialization and Urbanization

Industrialization of the Baltic States not only affected population growth patterns, but also had a major impact on the internal distribution of population in the region. Specifically, it increased the percentage of people living in cities. This process of urbanization is most pronounced in Lithuania. In 1950 only 729,000 persons or 28.3 percent of the republic's total population lived in urban areas. Between 1950 and 1979, Lithuania's urban population grew by 1.3 million persons, and its share of population living in urban places increased to 61.0 percent. This 32.7 percentage point increase was exceeded in the Soviet Union only by Belorussia.24

In 1950 the level of urbanization reached 47.0 percent in Estonia and 45.3 percent in Latvia. Given this relatively high percentage, the rate of urbanization in these two republics was less rapid than that in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the percentage of Estonia's population living in urban places increased by 23 points and reached 70 percent in 1979. This made Estonia the most urbanized republic in the Soviet Union. The urban population share in Latvia increased by 22.7 percentage points and reached 68 percent in 1979.25

The process of urbanization in Estonia and Latvia is dominated by the steady and continuous growth of their primate cities. More than 46 percent of the urban population growth in Latvia between 1959 and 1979 was accounted by Riga. During the same period, the city of Tallinn in Estonia accounted for 42.7 percent of the republic's urban population increase. The process of urbanization in Lithuania is more diffused. Vilnius — the republic's largest city and the most rapidly growing city in the Baltic region — accounted for only 23 percent of Lithuania's urban population increase.26

The rapid urbanization of the Baltic republics created a number of problems. First, it depopulated rural areas and led to an acute shortage of labor in agriculture. The massive exodus of youth not only aged the rural population, but also removed females of prime reproductive ages from the countryside. The demographic impact of this development is quite evident. The rate or rural population increase in Lithuania has dropped from 13.4 per thousand in 1960 to 5.2 in 1970, and 0.4 in 1977.27 It can be assumed that if this decrease has continued into the 1980s, then natural population decrease has become the main demographic trend in the Baltic countryside.

Lithuanian agriculture — which during the 1950s and 1960s had a surplus number of workers — is now experiencing a growing labor shortage. The seriousness of this problem is revealed by statements made by representatives of the agricultural sector at all levels of the administrative hierarchy. The Lithuanian SSR Deputy Minister of Agriculture noted that agriculture in 1979 had a deficit of 50,000 able-bodied workers.28 This shortfall is equivalent to 13 percent of the total 1979 agricultural work force. The chairman of the Joniškis raion Soviet complained that "collective and state farms in the raion are short of 500 trained farm machine operators, electricians, machinists, milkmaids, and other specialists — notwithstanding the fact that 600 persons living in urban places are already involved in the performance of these tasks. This is cause for concern."29

Mechanization of agriculture, paradoxically, can often exacerbate the manpower shortage problem. A. Balaišis, chairman of "Ateitis" Collective Farm in Anykščiai raion, points out that his farm has 70 tractors, but only 45 drivers. He feels that in order to use the tractors efficiently, the farm should have 100 drivers.30

Second, rapid urbanization has created an acute disproportion between the level of development of industry and the service sector. This not only reflects systemic deficiencies inherent in the branch approach used in Soviet planning and management, but also the greater priority given by central planners to industry. Even in a capital city such as Vilnius where there is a heavy concentration of administrative, cultural, educational, and trade activities, industry accounts for about. 42 percent of total employment and dominates the city's employment structure.31 Lithuanian planners have calculated that in order to satisfy the consumer needs of Vilnius inhabitants in. 1979, it was necessary to have about 113,000 persons working in the service or nonproductive sector. In reality only about 48,000 persons, or 42 percent of the established norm, were employed in this sector.32

Development of the social infrastructure has not kept pace with industrial growth in major cities. Lack of housing has led to increased commuting and use of dormitory type dwellings. Retail facilities — even new ones — are small, highly specialized, and scattered throughout the city. Even to buy the most basic everyday products, a shopper must visit many different stores and spend much time in line.33 It is not surprising that one of the leading Vilnius city planners complained that "we have fallen behind in the construction of retail, public catering, and everyday service facilities. Although we are building many health care facilities . . . polyclinics and hospitals are overcrowded. We have reason to complain about urban services — operation of public transit, sanitation, etc."34

The persistence of this disproportion between city-forming and city-serving activities has a major impact on the behavior pattern of the urban population. Demographicallv, it has led to a continuous drop in the rate of natural population increase in urban areas. With the depopulation of rural areas, natural population increase was maintained by the urban areas. But this is now in jeopardy — even in Lithuania which has the highest rate of natural population growth in the Baltic region. For example, the birthrate in Vilnius has dropped from 17.0/1,000 in 1970 to 14.3/1,000 in 1979.35 Indications are that the Vilnius' birthrate will continue to fall in the 1980s due to the reluctance of females to have more than one or two children.

Dissatisfaction with the quality of life and material conditions is the main reason why the number of offspring is limited. A survey conducted by the Lithuanian SSR State Manpower Resource Committee in 1982 revealed that 47 percent of the interviewed females in Vilnius stated that insufficient living space was their main reason for having small families. Another 27 percent indicated that their low income prevented them from having more than one or two children. It is interesting to note that of the more than 100,000 families living in Vilnius in 1979, only 280 had four or more children.36

Conclusion and Prognosis

Industrial development of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania followed the basic tenets of Soviet regional development doctrine. It did create specialized industries through which the economies of the Baltic republics became highly integrated in the economy of the Soviet Union as a whole. Emphasis on labor-intensive production led to a number of population changes. In Latvia and Estonia it depleted local manpower resources, intensified inter-republic migration, and dramatically changed the ethnic structure of these two republics. In Lithuania industrialization initially maximized the utilization of local manpower resources and helped to keep the influx of Russian and other ethnic groups at a relatively low level. Nevertheless, rural depopulation coupled with a falling urban birthrate indicate that Lithuania in the 1980s will find itself in a situation similar to that of Latvia and Estonia in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

A second basic change is urbanization. The growing concentration of people in a few large cities together with the slow development of the social infrastructure and service sector have led to a decreasing urban birthrate. In-migration — from within each republic and especially from outside — has become the main factor determining urban population growth in the region. Consequently almost all the major cities in the Baltic region tend to have a very diverse ethnic structure. This tends to promote intermarriage and ethnic assimilation.

Data for the city of Vilnius indicates that in 1978 approximately 38 percent of all marriages in the city were ethnically mixed and 37 percent of all infants born in the city came from ethnically mixed families. Assimilation tends to increase the Russian population. Between 1970 and 1979 assimilation increased the Russian population in Vilnius by 2,100 persons and accounted for 14.4 percent of its growth.37 Assimilation is particularly intense among members of small ethnic groups living in large cities. Members of these ethnic groups are included in the census category "other." Between 1970 and 1979 the number of persons in this category in Vilnius increased from 3,689 to 7,273. Almost 75 percent of this increase was accounted by intermarriage and assimilation. Since Russian is the language spoken in most of these newly formed ethnically mixed families, assimilation-related population growth of people in this category is tantamount to an increase in the city's Russian population.38

Attempts to transform Baltic society and achieve objectives of socialist internationalism have mixed results. Nationalistic tendencies and ethnic self-consciousness remain very strong among the eponymous peoples of the Baltic region. This fact is recognized by Soviet authorities. Nikolai Dybenko, Second Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, complained in April 1982 that "regrettably we still come across facts where a person, while recognizing internationalism as a political principle, has not liberated himself from limitations of nationality in life, family, and relations with other people."39 Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that nationalistic tendencies in the Baltic republics can be neutralized by increasing the absolute number and percentage of non-eponymous inhabitants. This in part explains the high level of nationalistic opposition in Lithuania and its relative dormancy or absence in Latvia.

The Soviet leadership appears to have concluded that the best way to promote socialist internationalism is at the work place — and especially at major new construction projects where young people from all parts of the Soviet Union are brought together. It is significant that Petras Griškevičius, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, in April 1982 for the first time stated publicly that formation of multinational worker collectives "in order to solve economic and social [italics mine] tasks in itself is a major party goal.40

Paralleling this new emphasis on formation of multinational worker collectives is a campaign to protect the "rights" of non-eponymous newcomers to the Baltic region. Dybenko notes that inter-republic migration to Lithuania will increase during the 1980s and that the specific needs of the newcomers with respect to language, culture, and everyday life will have to be satisfied.41 This call is repeated by H. Zabulis, Lithuanian SSR Minister of Higher and Specialized Education, who states that "Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, or any other representative of a large nationality group in a small national republic such as Estonia, Armenia, and Lithuania feels he is not a representative of a large nationality group but a member of an ethnic minority. Therefore, it is a matter of hospitality and culture not to deride such a person, but to create normal conditions for his life and work."42

What makes this new emphasis on formation of multinational worker collectives and protection of minority "rights" in the Baltic republics ominous is the fact that a new round of industrial development has begun in the Baltic republics. This qualitatively new stage of industrialization is based on the development of nuclear power, energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals, and export trade. The largest (6000 MW) nuclear power station in the world is presently under construction at Ignalina in Lithuania. A second large nuclear power station is envisaged for construction at Pavilosta — a coastal site between the port cities of Liepaja and Ventspils in Latvia. The oil refinery at Mažeikiai in Lithuania is to become a major new petrochemical complex.43 A new harbor comparable to Vostochny on the Pacific is being built near Tallinn. Given the fact that all three Baltic republics have a growing shortage of manpower, the new round of industrial development will increase inter-republic migration — especially to Lithuania. The accelerating increase in the size of the non-eponyrnous population may in fact accomplish what 40 years of Soviet rule has not — namely, it may complete the absorption of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union.


1 Helene Carrere d'Encause, Decline of An Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), 172.
2 Robin Knight, "How the Baltic States Torment Russia." US News & World Report, 25 September 1978, pp. 43-44.
3 William Atwood, "The Baltic States: In Custody," The Atlantic, April 1980, pp. 14-21.
4 Vyriausioji enciklopedijų redakcija, Lietuvos TSR (Vilnius: 1980), p. 29; "Tarybų Latvijos ekonomikos plėtojimas," Liaudies ūkis, No. 12 (1980), p. 24; G. Tynspojegas [Tynspoeg] "Tarybų Estijos ekonominė ir socialinė raida Tarybų valdžios metais," Liaudies ūkis, No. 4 (1982), p. 3.
5 K. Meškauskas, "Pabaltijos Tarybinių respublikų pramonės laimėjimai," Liaudies ūkis, No. 7 (1980), p. 5.
6 Lietuvos TSR, p. 29.
7 Meškauskas, p. 5.
8 K. Meškauskas and M. Meškauskienė, Lietuvos pramonė socializmo laikotarpiu (Vilnius: Mintis, 1980), p. 148.
9 Ibid., p. 137.
10 "Tarybų Latvijos ekonomikos plėtojimas," p. 24.
11 Lietuvos TSR CSV, Lietuvos TSR liaudies ūkis per 30 metų (Vilnius: Mintis), p. 33.
12 Tynspojegas, p. 5.
13 A. Mercaitis, "Respublikos miestų ugdymo problemos," Liaudies ūkis, No. 11 (1976), 331.
14 "Ar tinka galingai įmonei šluotkočių gamyba?", Komunistas, No. 8 (1981), pp. 58-59.
15 Ibid., p. 59.
16 Lietuvos TSR Aukščiausiosios Tarybos (devintojo šaukimo) dešimtoji sesija, birželio 29, 1978, Stenogramos (Vilnius: Mintis, 1978), p. 50.
17 V. Rupas and L. Vaitekūnas, Lietuvos kaimo gyventojai ir gyvenvietės (Vilnius: Mintis, 1980), p. 99.
18 Calculated on basis of data given by Rein Taagepera, "Baltic Population Changes, 1950-1980," Journal of Baltic Studies, 12 (Spring 1981): 36.
19 Ibid.
20 Helene Carrere d'Encause, p. 267.
21 V. Stanley Vardys, "Modernization and Baltic Nationalism," Problems of Communism 24 (September-October 1975): 39; and P. Adlys, "Mūsų gyventojai," Mokslas ir gyvenimas, No. 3 (1980), pp. 10-12.
22 Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousness since 1959," in George W. Simmonds, ed., Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe (Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977), p. 149.
23 A. Stanaitis and P. Adlys, Lietuvos TSR gyventojai (Vilnius: Mintis, 1973), p. 104; P. Adlys, „Mūsų gyventojai," pp. 10-12.
24 Petras Gaučas, "Lietuvos TSR gyventojų pasiskirstymas," Mokslas ir gyvenimas, No. 12 (1978), p. 13.
25 Ibid.; "Sąjunginio 1979 metų gyventojų surašymo preliminariniai rezultatai," Tiesa, 22 April 1979, p. 2.
26 A. Stanaitis, "Kai kurie Pabaltijo gyventojų dinamikos ir pasiskirstymo 1959-1970 m. klausimai," Geografija ir geologija 9 (1972), p. 104; "Sąjunginio 1979 metų surašymo rezultatai," p. 2.
27 Rupas and Vaitekūnas, p. 93; R. Songaila, "Perspektivy proizvodstva sel'skokhozyaistvennovo proizvodstva respubliki," Planovoe khozyaist-vo, No. 1 (1981), p. 105.
28 V. Ožiūnas, "Darbo jėgos ištekliai kaime," Žemės ūkis, No. 10 (1980), p. 2.
29 V. Stanulevičius, "Įvertinkime rajono savitumus," Tiesa, 7 January 1981, p. 2.
30 A. Balaišis, "Kliūtys įveikiamos," Valstiečių laikraštis, 9 October 1981, p. 2.
31 J. Žiugžda, ed., Vilniaus miesto istorija (Vilnius: Mintis, 1972), p. 249.
32 ]. Vaškevičius, "Vilniaus rytojus," Mokslas ir gyvenimas, No. 5 (1982), p. 6.
33 A. Idzelis, "Controlled Urbanization in the Lithuanian SSR and the Problem of Vilnius," Proceedings of the East Lakes Division of the AAG: Selected Papers (Akron: University of Akron Press, 1979), pp. 32-35.
34 Vaškevičius, p. 6.
35 "Kur miesto raktai? Švyturys, No. 24 (1980), p. 5.
36 Ibid.
37 P. Gaucas and M. Karalienė, "Dabartinės Vilniaus gyventojų nacionalinės sudėties kitimo tendencijos," Geografija 17 (1981): 127, 131.
38 Ibid,
39 "Ištikimybė Lenino priesakams," Interview with Second Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Nikolai Dybenko, Nemunas, No. 4 (1982), p. 8.
40 P. Griškevičius, "Tarybinis patriotizmas ir socialistinis internacionalizmas," Švyturys, No. 1 (1982), p. 6.
41 Dybenko, p. 8.
42 H. Zabulis, "Internacionalinio auklėjimo procesas," Mokslas ir technika, No. 12 (1982), p. 4.
43 A. Idzelis, "Socioeconomic and Environmental Impact of the Ignalina Atomic Power Station," Journal of Baltic Studies 14 (Fall 1983) (Forthcoming).